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Mensaje: <blockquote data-quote="BorisD" data-source="post: 1982359" data-attributes="member: 13557">Sigo esperando la cita de los F-15 lanzando y fallando 11 AMRAAMs. <img src="https://i.imgur.com/GIeJL.gif"  class="smilie" loading="lazy" alt="biuhhhh" title="biuhhhh    biuhhhh" data-shortname="biuhhhh" /> Ambos sabemos que no pasó."Obsoleto". Un solo derribo. La operación contra esa IADS fue un total éxito. Justamente, es un ejemplo de una operación bien llevada a cabo.Esto no es discutible, obvio.No es comparable. No consistió en el empleo de fuerzas de superficie en avance, cómo si hubo en Vietnam o en ODS. También es necesario considerar las condiciones -limitaciones- en que se llevó a cabo:"Moreover, unlike in the more permissive Desert Storm operating environment, airspace availability limitations in the war zone typically made for high predictability on the part of attacking NATO aircraft, and collateral damage avoidance considerations frequently prevented the use of the most tactically advantageous attack headings""The commander of USAFE, General Jumper, later added that the CAOC could never get NATO political clearance to attack the most troublesome early warning radars in Montenegro which meant that the Serbs knew when attacks were coming most of the time."Luego, sí, se mencionan deficiencias de organización "In other cases, the cumbersome command and control arrangements and the need for prior CAOC approval before fleeting pop-up IADS targets detected by Rivet Joint or other allied sensors could be attacked resulted in many lost opportunities and few hard kills of enemy SAM sites", y deficiencias de los equipos empleados: problemas con la detección de objetivos con los E-8 (solucionado, en parte), dificultades con los Prowler, etc.Sin embargo, está claro que "jugar" a cazar determinados sistemas no es lo mismo que una guerra total. Asimismo, la operación "fracasó" desde el punto de vista de que el objetivo de neutralizar toda la actividad antiaérea, pero esta en realidad no afectó (y mucho menos lo habría hecho en caso de que la intervención de la coalición hubiera sido mayor) la posibilidad de desarrollar operaciones de apoyo a tropas en tierra/bombardeos.De hecho, más fracaso se prueba la red de defensa aérea "In all, more than 800 SAMs were reported to have been fired at NATO aircraft, both manned and unmanned, over the course of the 78-day air war, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed man-portable infrared missiles (see Figure 6.1 for a depiction of reported enemy SAM launches by type).19 A majority of the fixed SAMs were fired without any radar guidance. Yet despite that expenditure of assets, only two NATO aircraft, an F-117 and an F-16, were shot down by enemy fire, although another F-117 sustained light damage from a nearby SA-3 detonation and two A-10s were hit by enemy AAA fire but not downed. 20 There also were two reported cases of short-range infrared (IR)-guided missiles hitting A-10s, one of which apparently struck the bottom of the aircraft, defused itself, and bounced off...".Sí, el texto enuncia "Yet enough of the Serb IADS remained intact to require NATO fighters to operate above the 15,000-ft hard deck for most of the air effort. The main reason for this requirement was the persistent AAA and MANPADS threat." y "However, NATO never fully succeeded in neutralizing the Serb IADS, and NATO aircraft operating over Serbia and Kosovo were always within the engagement envelopes of enemy SA-3 and SA-6 missiles".Es decir, aún cuando los esfuerzos de la coalición (con sus limitaciones) no resultaron en la destrucción o supresión completa de las defensas, estas no fueron capaces de destruir más de 2 aeronaves, y no impidieron (ni hubieran impedido) la actividad de los A-10 (menos hubieran impedido la actividad de otros elementos empleados para asistir a tropas terrestres en misiones de AI y CAS).Interesante lectura por cierto, Mario. Gracias.<img src="https://www.zona-militar.com/foros/styles/default/xenforo/smilies/icon_beerchug.gif"  class="smilie" loading="lazy" alt="Beerchug" title="Beerchug    Beerchug" data-shortname="Beerchug" />"Using what was called fused radar input, which allowed the acquisition and tracking of NATO aircraft from the north and the subsequent feeding of the resulting surveillance data to air defense radars in the south, this internetting enabled the southern sector operations center to cue defensive weapons (including shoulder-fired man-portable SAMs and AAA positions) at other locations in the country where there was no active radar nearby. That may have accounted, at least in part, for why the F-16CJ and EA-6B were often ineffective as SAM killers, since both employed the HARM to home in on enemy radars that normally operated in close proximity to SAM batteries"."If we try to jam an emitter in the south,” he said, “there may be a northern one that can relay the information through a communications link and land line. They are fighting on their own turf and know where to hide"Saludos</blockquote>

Verificación: Libertador de Argentina