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Mensaje: <blockquote data-quote="koinorr" data-source="post: 1613603" data-attributes="member: 2417">Por lo que leí antes, como era más barato comprar U3O8 yellow cake que extraerlo y procesarlo en Argentina compramos en Rusia ahora Canadá, oferta, precio y demanda hasta ahí todo normal. Que busquemos partners para explotar nuestros propios recursos puede ser síntoma de que no podemos solos sea por dinero, por tecnología para encontrarlo y extraerlo de forma rentable. No me parece malo, siempre y cuando volvamos a hacer viables nuestros recursos uraniferos, se llevarán un porcentaje claro está pero nosotros lo necesitaremos.Con respecto a la situación de la India es anormal, es una potencia nuclear y por tanto no es una nación NPT, razón por la cual tiene/tenía restringido el comercio de combustible nuclear con paises NPT por el Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), no obstante USA y Canadá se encargan de que tenga un status similar a China mediante sucesivas firmas de acuerdos, mientras la gran Rusia les ha vendido de cualquier forma. Esta situación especial de poner sus reactores bajo normas de de seguridad de la IAEA pero ser potencia nuclear parece haberse solucionado. No sé si fue por presión exterior que Argentina finalizó la cooperación con Hindustán en los 90s.<a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Non-Proliferation/Safeguards-to-Prevent-Nuclear-Proliferation/">http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Non-Proliferation/Safeguards-to-Prevent-Nuclear-Proliferation/</a>India’s emergence as de facto weapons state under NPTIndia's situation as a nuclear-armed country excluded it from the NPT* so this and the related lack of full-scope IAEA safeguards meant that India was isolated from world trade by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (see below). A clean waiver to the trade embargo was agreed in September 2008 in recognition of the country's impeccable non-proliferation credentials. India has always been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons material and technology are guarded against commercial or illicit export to other countries.* India could only join the NPT if it disarmed and joined as a Non Nuclear Weapons State, which is politically impossible.In December 2006 the US Congress passed legislation to enable moves towards nuclear trade with India. Then in July 2007 a nuclear cooperation agreement with India was finalized, opening the way for India's participation in international commerce in nuclear fuel and equipment and requiring India to put most of the country's nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards and close down the CIRUS research reactor by 2010. It would allow India to reprocess US-origin and other foreign-sourced nuclear fuel at a new national plant under IAEA safeguards. This would be used fuel arising from those 14 reactors designated as unambiguously civilian and under full IAEA safeguards.The IAEA greeted the deal as being "a creative break with the past" – where India was excluded from the NPT. After much delay in India's parliament, it then set up a new and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, plus an Additional Protocol. The IAEA board approved this in July 2008, after the agreement had threatened to bring down the Indian government. The agreement is similar to those between IAEA and non nuclear weapons states, notably Infcirc-66, the IAEA's information circular that lays out procedures for applying facility-specific safeguards, hence much more restrictive than many in India's parliament wanted.The next step in bringing India into the fold was the consensus resolution of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 to exempt India from its rule of prohibiting trade with non members of the NPT. A bilateral trade agreement then went to US Congress for final approval. Similar agreements followed with Russia and France. The ultimate objective is to put India on the same footing as China in respect to responsibilities and trade opportunities, though it has had to accept much tighter international controls than other nuclear-armed countries.The introduction to India's safeguards agreement with IAEA says that India's access to assured supplies of fresh fuel is an "essential basis" for New Delhi's acceptance of IAEA safeguards on some of its reactors and that India has a right to take "corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." But the introduction also says that India will "provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time." In the course of NSG deliberations India also gave assurances regarding weapons testing.In October 2008 US Congress passed the bill allowing civil nuclear trade with India, and a nuclear trade agreement was signed with France. The 2008 agreements ended 34 years of trade isolation on nuclear materials and technology. The CIRUS research reactor was shut down on 31 December 2010.India's safeguards agreement with IAEA was signed early in 2009, though the timeframe for bringing the extra reactors under safeguards still had to be finalised. The Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement was agreed by the IAEA Board in March 2009 and signed in May 2009 by India. The decision to ratify was announced under the new government in June 2014, with 20 facilities listed, including six at the Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad and two stores at Tarapur, plus 12 reactors. The Additional Protocol came into force on 25 July 2014, giving the IAEA enhanced access to India’s civil power facilities.In April 2012 India told the UN Security Council that given its ability and willingness to promote global non-proliferation objectives, and that it already adhered to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), "as a country with the ability and willingness to promote global non-proliferation objectives, we believe that the next logical step is India's membership of the four export control regimes." The other two ‘regimes’ are the informal Australia Group (re chemical and biological weapons) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on export control for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. India also supports the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Following ratification of the Additional Protocol, India will pursue membership of these four export control regimes.Apart from safeguards, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is designed particularly to cap the production of weapons-grade fissile materials in both NPT Nuclear Weapons States and India, Pakistan and Israel. India has expressed support for a verifiable Cut-off Treaty, China, Pakistan and Iran are opposed to one. The USA is not keen on such a Treaty being verifiable.Por negocios solucionamos rápido la situación con una potencia energética del mundo.<a href="http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media-room/news-release/2013/11496">http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media-room/news-release/2013/11496</a>Harper Government announces coming into force of Canada–India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Cameco venderá a India uranio.Otro negocioChina trabaja con AECL von transferencia tecnológica para lograr la reutilización del combustible de uranio quemado. Y como ya hemos visto la CNNC explora en Namibia con CAMECO detrás. CAMECO es el diablo está en todas partes, dándolo todo por el combustible. Es "CAMELCO" el mayor productor de combustible y exportador de uranio para PHWR del mundo.Sldos</blockquote>

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