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<blockquote data-quote="Iconoclasta" data-source="post: 462996" data-attributes="member: 52"><p><strong><p style="text-align: center"><span style="font-size: 18px">Brazil Embarking Upon F-X2 Fighter Program</span></p><p></strong></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_F-5BR_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p> <p style="text-align: center"><em>Upgraded F-5BR</em></p> <p style="text-align: center"><em></em></p><p></p><p>In January 2008, a number of DID readers informed us that Brazil’s President Lula had authorized Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the long-delayed F-X fighter replacement program. “F-X2” aims to acquire 36 next generation fighters for the Brazilian Air Force, which is currently depending on Super Tucano/ALX surveillance and light attack turboprops, AMX subsonic light fighters, modernized F-5BRs whose design dates back to the 1960s, and a squadron of 12 Mirage 2000s built in the early 1980s. A previous 2001 F-X competition was put on hold in 2003, and then canceled in February 2004 due to budget difficulties and political issues. The initial budget for the current iteration is said to be $2.2 billion, but the RFP leaves the door open for a fourfold increase over time.</p><p></p><p>Could the words “Brazilian fighter” begin evoking images unrelated to the Gracies? A proposed 50% boost to Brazil’s defense budget could be on its way to accomplishing that, and more. While the Navy and Army are also in line for funds to replace broken-down equipment, the fighters will be a critical centerpiece of the Forca Aerea Brasileira’s efforts. The aircraft under consideration are mostly the same set of 4+ generation fighters that were considered last time – but the competition may have become more important to at least one of the competitors.</p><p></p><p>Now Boeing and Lockheed Martin appear to have finalized their offers, which gives the competition more choices than it had before. DID reports on those decisions, and adds its assessment of their offers’ relative strengths and weaknesses.</p><p></p><p>The competition was moving into its final phase – but Russian sources now say the tender has been re-opened…</p><p></p><p>After its existing Mirage IIIs simply wore out and had to be retired at the end of 2005, FAB Command worked out a plan to find an emergency interim replacement. The final choice was 12 second-hand French Mirage 2000Cs. The airframes selected by Brazil were produced for France between 1984 -1987, and began arriving in Brazil in 2006.</p><p></p><p>Inducting 20 year old aircraft is not a long-term solution. Especially for a country that reportedly has about 37% of its 719 plane air force grounded, due to age and the toll Brazil’s environment takes on machines of all types. Like many of its neighbors, Brazil is also becoming more and more concerned about Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez’s large arms purchases, and his aggressive activities within the region. This is especially true in Bolivia, which supplies an important percentage of Brazil’s natural gas.</p><p></p><p>Brazil actually has a reasonably solid mid-tier to its air force. Its Brazilian-Italian AMX subsonic light attack jets and indigenous Super Tucano COIN/surveillance turboprops are quality offerings within their respective niches, and they are backed up by a small but advanced set of airborne, ground looking and maritime radar aircraft based on Embraer’s ERJ-145 business jets. They will be augment by 12 refurbished P-3 Orions bought to patrol Brazil’s huge coast and maritime economic zone.</p><p></p><p>The high end of the FAB’s fighter fleet, however, is inferior even when judged by regional standards. This might not be a huge concern if its neighbors possessed only short-range or limited capability fighters. Venezuela’s large defense expenditures, however, and especially its recent purchase of long-range, 4+ generation SU-30MK fighters instead of more clearly defensive alternatives like the MiG-29, appears to have had the effect of triggering countermoves in several quarters. Even so, Lula’s government is careful to stress that this is not about an arms race. Defense Minister Nelson Jobim reportedly said in a 2007 public speech that:</p><p></p><p>“Brazil has well established, peaceful relations with all South American nations … one of our political priorities is economic and structural integration of the region … (and in 2008) we’ll also be strengthening our military links…. [Brazil cannot] neglect its defense. Therefore, we will increase our budget outlays and investment in the army, navy and air force by more than 50 percent…. [Brazil] is elaborating a national strategy defense plan that will determine each military branch’s mission and the equipment it needs for its activities”.</p><p></p><p>According to official figures made public on Nov 4/07, Brazil has requested $5 billion for its 2008 defense budget, with the possibility of raising it to $5.64 billion. In 2007, Brazil’s military budget was around $3.5 billion. </p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_AMX_Brazil_Armed_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p><em><p style="text-align: center">AMX light fighter</p><p></em></p><p>President Lula da Silva’s administration has larger plans than just equipment recapitalization, saying that “we must overcome the lack of strategic planning and the technological dismantling of the last two decades.” The new National Defence Strategy group is designed to plan and execute the recovery of the “capability of our armed forces and the technological edge we once had in certain fields.”</p><p></p><p>Brazil maintained an impressive niche capability during the 1970s and 1980s in areas like tank and armored vehicle design, rockets, missiles, and of course aircraft. Unfortunately, in a world divided by cold war allegiances, there was often little room for a non-aligned 3rd party exporter. While some projects like the Tucano succeeded, and others like the AMX enjoyed qualified success, many promising projects saw limited exports at best, or became failed efforts.</p><p></p><p>The world is no longer divided into such camps, however, which may offer the Brazilian defense industry a second chance if it partners well and executes smartly. According to the main guidelines of the da Silva’s long term strategy, Brazilian defense industry should look to become a player again in the export of missiles, aircraft and other equipment. DID would be surprised if UAVs, with their long endurance surveillance capabilities and natural connection to Brazil’s aviation industry, didn’t also become a priority. The overal thrust of Brazil’s policies is certainly clear: “We must convince ourselves that we can become a world power this century,” says President Lula da Silva.</p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/PUB_Brazils_Army_Amazon_1999_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p> <p style="text-align: center"><em>Military Review, 1999</em></p><p></p><p>On the one hand, these statements remind one of the old joke that goes: “Brazil is the nation of the future – and always will be.”</p><p></p><p>On the other hand, anteing up with a 50% hike of the defense budget certainly displays seriousness, and Brazil has already set up a key partnership to develop the 5th generation A-Darter short range air-air missile with South Africa. A similar deal with Israel for its Derby/Alto radar guided missile is also expected at some point, and RFPs went out recently for a handful of medium transport helicopters (AW EH101, EADS EC725, Russian Mi-171V) and some attack helicopters (AW-TAI A129, EADS Tiger, Russian Mi-35M – which won).</p><p></p><p>The giant may be stirring again. A handful of fighters and helicopters, plus ships to patrol its coasts, won’t exactly make anyone a world power – and Brazil has an equally urgent and unfilled need for transport aircraft. Still, these buys may go a long way toward ensuring the nation’s ability to patrol and enforce its long borders. The right deals may also allow Brazil to re-establish its faded indigenous defense industry on the world stage.</p><p></p><p><strong>F-X2: The Competition</strong></p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_Rafale-M_Launch_CVN-65_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>For this second round of the FX competition, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, and Sukhoi’s recently-unveiled SU-35 were all reported to be back in contention. All were expected to bid, and Boeing added its F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet. The FAB was also said to be interested in the Lockheed-Martin F-35, but the finalized nature of the Lighting’s industrial production partnership program was likely to keep the program from delivering the industrial offsets Brazil seeks. Meanwhile, a pair of competitors from earlier rounds faded out. Dassault’s Mirage 2000 production line was closing, and Brazil did not mention the F-16 as a contender – or advance Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR Block 70 offer to the finals.</p><p></p><p>Reporter Tania Monteiro of the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo writes that technology transfer will be an essential part of any deal, and quotes influential Workers’ Party Deputy (PT is Lula’s party, Deputy = MP or Congressman) Jose Genoino as saying:</p><p></p><p>“France is always the better partner. Concerning Russia, everyone knows the difficulties and we don’t know what is going to happen in ten years so that we will be able to guarantee our spare parts. The USA, traditionally, does not transfer technology…. We want to seek the lowest price with the most technology transfer.”</p><p></p><p>If his assessment of Brazil’s priorities remains true, that country could represent a critical last chance for France to get some export momentum and success behind its Rafale, which has lost every competition it has entered thus far (Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, UAE, et. al.). To win, France will need to come up with a strong package. According to reports, the indications are that technology transfer will be more important than cost in terms of the final choice. Defence minister Nelson Jobim:</p><p></p><p>“Whatever the final contract it must be closely linked to national development, to help advance in the creation of a strong defense industry and therefore the technological edge we are requesting.”</p><p></p><p><strong>Analysis: F-X2, The Competitors</strong></p><p></p><p>Some quick handicapping follows.</p><p></p><p><strong>Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS/European – eliminated): </strong></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_Eurofighter-RAF_Fires_ASRAAM_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>Technology transfer may prove to be an issue, but price was always likely to be the biggest one. Eurofighters consistently sell for $110-130 million, which doesn’t square well with $2.2 billion for 36 planes. The most capable air-air choice in the group would provide unquestioned regional air superiority, but ground surveillance and strike performance is still provisional (Tranche I v6), or unproven (Tranche 2+). This has been fatal in competitions like Singapore’s, and may have proven to be a handicap here.</p><p></p><p>On the plus side, EADS Airbus offers a potent option for industrial offsets, and other EADS subsidiaries have footholds of their own. Airbus military’s A400M medium transport may create additional military nterest in a long term industrial partnership, and EADS Eurocopter’s Cougar has just become the medium-lift mainstay of Brazil’s future helicopter fleet.</p><p></p><p><strong>JAS-39 Gripen (Saab/BAE)</strong> </p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_JAS-39_Gripen_Top_Smokewinders_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>Saab offers strong industrial partnerships, and has a record of successful technology transfer agreements. The next-generation Gripen Demo program offers key industrial opportunities, along with a high-performance, affordable fighter. Gripens can operate from highways if need be, which gives Brazil great flexibility in deploying them. They would also give Brazil’s Air Force commonality with A-Darter air-air missile missile partner and political ally South Africa, which operates JAS-39C/Ds. Selex Galileo’s Vixen 500 AESA radar will also be offered, leveraging that firm’s successful history with Brazil’s F-5BR (Grifo-F) and AMX (Scipio) fighter programs.</p><p></p><p>These factors make Gripen a strong contender. Its F404/F414 engine offers the advantages of certain performance and a very broad customer base, but is subject to US export approvals if that’s an issue for Brazil.</p><p></p><p>A more pressing weakness may be the fact that each plane only has one engine, since Brazil combines vast over-water areas and even vaster wilderness areas to patrol. Those requirements usually translate into a focus on range and 2-engine safety, which have worked against Gripen in other competitions. Most of Brazil’s other fighters (Tucano ALX, AMX, Mirage 2000) have just one engine, however, so it’s a question of how the RFP requirements are set. To date, it does not seem to be a problem.</p><p></p><p><strong>F-35 Lightning II/ F-16BR (Lockheed Martin – eliminated)</strong></p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_F-35B_JSF_STOVL_Landing_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>F-35 industrial partnership and technology transfer issues proved too difficult to overcome, so Lockheed is offering an F-16BR instead. It will probably resemble the F-16E/F “Block 70” variant being offered to India, with an AESA radar and built-in IRST/targeting sensors, an uprated engine, et. al. Both India and Brazil are fond of Israeli avionics and weapons, so those aspects are also likely to be common to both offers.</p><p></p><p>The F-16BR offers shares many of the Super Hornet’s perceived benefits and drawbacks: AESA radar and sensors and weaker American dollar on the plus side, poorer aerodynamic performance and distrust of America as an interfering supplier on the minus side. The F-16 cannot play the carrier-compatible card like the Super Hornet, and offers only a single-engine design. On the other hand, it does offer wide compatibility with other regional and global air forces, and its cost is significantly lower.</p><p></p><p>The F-35 would have offered a clear set of performance benefits over competing aircraft. No aircraft in this group could have matched the Lightning’s advanced surveillance capabilities, and surveillance is a big need in Brazil. The F-35B STOVL variant also offered Brazil the ability to operate from small, dispersed runways, and it would have been perfect for aircraft carriers like Brazil’s Sao Paolo (ex-Foch). Unfortunately, technology transfer issues were not the F-35’s only problem. Other barriers to an F-35 win included questions surrounding air-air performance against Venezuela’s SU-30MKs, the low likelihood of deliveries before 2016, and its single engine design. </p><p></p><p><strong>Rafale (Dassault)</strong> Despite its past history of failure in international competitions, the Rafale has a lot of advantages in this competition. It can play the carrier-compatible card, since the Sao Paolo was once FNS Foch. Experience with the Mirage 2000 offers a common technological and training base, and France is seen as a good supplier who avoids political interference and makes good on technology transfers. The one real negative is the Rafale’s narrow range of integrated weapons – but offers of partnerships in some of those areas might serve to hit 2 targets at once by playing the tech transfer card more strongly. Since Dassault really, really needs this deal, they should be very motivated on price. If they can’t make it here, they may not be able to make it anywhere.</p><p></p><p><strong>SU-35 (Sukhoi/ Rosoboronexport – eliminated?) </strong></p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_Su35b_KnAAPO_Pic_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>This was the aircraft Russia offered in the last round. Russian tech transfer is trusted. Lack of political interference is trusted absolutely. The aircraft itself offers an option that’s slightly better than the SU-30MK, but still presents itself to the region as an equivalency move. The price will be good, and Sukhoi has some support in the air force. On the other hand, service and parts delivery are almost guaranteed to be bad. That gives the FAB real pause.</p><p></p><p>One way around that is to offer licensed local production, though it would have to extend to the aircraft’s NPO Saturn engines and fitted avionics, in order to solve the Russian service problem1.</p><p></p><p><strong>F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Block II (Boeing)</strong></p><p></p><p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_F-18E_Super_Hornet_Parked_lg.jpg" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>The Super Hornet shares the carrier-compatible card with Dassault’s Rafale, but compatibility with a smaller carrier like the Sao Paolo would have to be established. Boeing also shares a key advantage with EADS’ Eurofighter when it comes to industrial offsets, thanks to Boeing’s passenger aircraft division. The Block II version’s proven APG-79 AESA radar offers Brazil an attractive technology, and a weaker American dollar makes American exports more affordable.</p><p></p><p>On the flip side, the Super Hornet offers poorer aerodynamic performance than other competitors, falling behind in areas like maneuverability, acceleration, etc. This weakness is compounded by the fact that Super Hornets sell for about $75-90 million each, placing them above the Gripen, F-16 E/F+, and the SU-35, but below the Eurofighter. Concerns about America’s propensity to use arms export bans as a political lever add a final complication to the Super Hornet’s odds. </p><p></p><p><strong>Updates and Key Events</strong></p><p></p><p>April 6/09: Competition re-opened? Russia’s RIA Novosti quotes Alexander Fomin, deputy director of Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation:</p><p></p><p>“We are actively participating in the Brazilian tender, which has been reopened. It involves over 100 fighter planes. Russia has made a bid in the tender with its Su-35 multirole fighter. The tender has stiff requirements, involving not only the sale, but also the transfer of technology. It is a key condition of the deal and Russia is ready to satisfy it…. We are discussing with the well-known Brazilian company Embraer the transfer of technology and the construction of facilities for the future licensed production of the aircraft…”</p><p></p><p>Fomin reportedly added that such a facility could also produce the 5th generation PAK-FA fighter being developed in conjunction with India. Experiences with the American F-22 and F-35 suggest that this would depend on the sophistication of the facilities. Stealth fighters require new equipment and techniques that go beyond normal aircraft construction standards, and a facility set up to produce even 4+ generation fighters may not be adequate.</p><p></p><p>March 30/09: The Brazilian Air force announces [in Portuguese] that it is beginning visits and technical evaluation of the 3 finalists. This evaluation will include test flights, and evaluation of the bids’ technical, industrial and maintenance offerings.</p><p></p><p>March 24/09: Dassault’s acquisition of a large stake in Thales led to Thales’ refusal to sell Saab the RBE2 AESA radar beyond the Gripen Demo stage. In response, Saab and SELEX Galileo sign an agreement to develop an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for the JAS-39NG. The arrangement is initially aimed at Brazil’s fighter competition, where it leverages Selex Galileo’s strong pedigree equipping Brazil’s F-5BR fighters (Grifo-F radar) and AMX light attack jets (Scipio radar). Once integrated and proven, however, the AESA upgrade would be available to any Gripen customer.</p><p></p><p>Per Aviation Week’s March 10/09 report from Aero India, the radar will use a Vixen 500 AESA front end, with “back end” modules from the existing PS-05/A. Using those back end modules simplifies integration, and also avoids the control issues inherent in American alternatives. As it happens, the 2 firms have a long history of radar partnerships. Ericsson (now Saab’s) partner on the original PS-05/A was Ferranti, which became GEC-Marconi, then BAE Systems, and now Selex Galileo. Selex was also Saab’s partner in the recent M-AESA R&D project.</p><p></p><p>The Vixen 500 AESA radar is currently used in the USA by border surveillance aircraft, but it has yet to see service on a fighter. Korea’s F/A-50 was recently barred from using the Vixen 500E, under an agreement with co-developer Lockheed Martin that did not allow the F/A-50’s capabilities to surpass the ROKAF’s F-16s. Saab | Gripen International.</p><p></p><p>Feb 2/09: Bids are in. Boeing confirms that it has submitted a bid involving 36 F/A-18 Super Hornet Block IIs, with the APG-79 AESA radar.</p><p></p><p>Gripen International confirms a bid involving 36 JAS-39NG aircraft, with longer range, AESA radars, and other enhancements. Their release adds that Brazil will have “direct involvement in the development, production and maintenance of the platform but it will also generate transfer of key technology including access to Gripen source codes.”</p><p></p><p>It is presumed that Dassault also submitted a 36-plane bid for its Rafale fighter. Boeing release | Gripen International release.</p><p></p><p>November 2008: Russia and Brazil sign a series of agreements on military technology cooperation. As is customary, the agreements set out protocols for the protection of intellectual property rights and technology secrets, which make joint ventures and local production easier to manage. Source.</p><p></p><p>Oct 30/08: RFP is out. Brazil’s FAB formally issues the RFP to the short-listed competitors. The 3 firms will have until Feb 2/09 to present their proposals, which must include operational, logistic, industrial, commercial, technical, commercial compensation (offset) and technology transfer details. FAB release [Portuguese].</p><p></p><p>Oct 1/08: Brazil has decided on its 3 finalists: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, and Saab/BAE’s JAS-39 Gripen.</p><p></p><p>EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all failed to make the cut. Brazilian FAB release [Portuguese] | Reuters | Boeing release | Gripen International release.</p><p></p><p>Aug 27/08: Defesanet reports that Lockheed Martin will be offering an F-16BR for Brazil’s F-X2, rather than the F-35. The report adds that barriers to technology transfer of some F-35 systems played a role in this decision. Defesanet [Portuguese] | Forecast International.</p><p></p><p>July 30/08: Boeing delivers a detailed proposal July 30 offering its advanced F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet to the Brazilian Air Force. The aircraft would be similar to the F/A-18Fs ordered by the Royal Australian Air Force, and would include Raytheon’s APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar. Boeing release.</p><p></p><p>June 12/08: Boeing (and presumably other manufacturers) receive the Brazilian RFP. The stated initial requirement is for 36 aircraft, with the potential for up to 120 aircraft. Boeing release | FAB statment (Brazilian air force).</p><p></p><p>January 2008: Brazil’s President Lula formally authorizes Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the F-X program.</p><p></p><p>November 2007: Brazil’s decision to hold an “F-X2” competition is announced by the Brazilian press.</p><p></p><p>Footnotes</p><p></p><p>1 Russian firms tend to partner due to local political necessity, or to gain technologies/ quality level they do not have, rather than as a strategic option for penetrating new markets. In Brazil’s case, one logical option would be a partnership with India to offer the thrust-vectoring, canard-winged SU-30MKI, which is arguably superior to the SU-35. The aircraft are partly produced in India, and already have obvious slots for tech transfer because that was built into the Indian program.</p><p></p><p>A 3-way deal leveraging India’s HAL, and setting up an NPO Saturn engine plant in Brazil, would have offered several benefits. It would offer India and other SU-30 customers a welcome second engine source, even as Brazil’s aerospace industry receives a critical additional puzzle piece in engine construction, the FAB removes the biggest historical problem with Russian planes, and Russia substantially strengthens its lobbying effort.</p><p></p><p>On the avionics and electronics front, Elbit Systems avionics could be sourced from the Brazilian subsidiary AEL to offer fleet commonality, and some can be found in the SU-30MKI already. Indian electronics used in the SU-30MKI would offer additional options for international cooperation and license production, alongside Israeli options that already equip Brazilian aircraft.</p><p></p><p>The question is whether the Russians were ever good enough at partnering to pull something like that off, or were even willing to try.</p><p></p><p><a href="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com">http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com</a></p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Iconoclasta, post: 462996, member: 52"] [B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Brazil Embarking Upon F-X2 Fighter Program[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_F-5BR_lg.jpg[/IMG] [I]Upgraded F-5BR [/I][/CENTER] In January 2008, a number of DID readers informed us that Brazil’s President Lula had authorized Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the long-delayed F-X fighter replacement program. “F-X2” aims to acquire 36 next generation fighters for the Brazilian Air Force, which is currently depending on Super Tucano/ALX surveillance and light attack turboprops, AMX subsonic light fighters, modernized F-5BRs whose design dates back to the 1960s, and a squadron of 12 Mirage 2000s built in the early 1980s. A previous 2001 F-X competition was put on hold in 2003, and then canceled in February 2004 due to budget difficulties and political issues. The initial budget for the current iteration is said to be $2.2 billion, but the RFP leaves the door open for a fourfold increase over time. Could the words “Brazilian fighter” begin evoking images unrelated to the Gracies? A proposed 50% boost to Brazil’s defense budget could be on its way to accomplishing that, and more. While the Navy and Army are also in line for funds to replace broken-down equipment, the fighters will be a critical centerpiece of the Forca Aerea Brasileira’s efforts. The aircraft under consideration are mostly the same set of 4+ generation fighters that were considered last time – but the competition may have become more important to at least one of the competitors. Now Boeing and Lockheed Martin appear to have finalized their offers, which gives the competition more choices than it had before. DID reports on those decisions, and adds its assessment of their offers’ relative strengths and weaknesses. The competition was moving into its final phase – but Russian sources now say the tender has been re-opened… After its existing Mirage IIIs simply wore out and had to be retired at the end of 2005, FAB Command worked out a plan to find an emergency interim replacement. The final choice was 12 second-hand French Mirage 2000Cs. The airframes selected by Brazil were produced for France between 1984 -1987, and began arriving in Brazil in 2006. Inducting 20 year old aircraft is not a long-term solution. Especially for a country that reportedly has about 37% of its 719 plane air force grounded, due to age and the toll Brazil’s environment takes on machines of all types. Like many of its neighbors, Brazil is also becoming more and more concerned about Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez’s large arms purchases, and his aggressive activities within the region. This is especially true in Bolivia, which supplies an important percentage of Brazil’s natural gas. Brazil actually has a reasonably solid mid-tier to its air force. Its Brazilian-Italian AMX subsonic light attack jets and indigenous Super Tucano COIN/surveillance turboprops are quality offerings within their respective niches, and they are backed up by a small but advanced set of airborne, ground looking and maritime radar aircraft based on Embraer’s ERJ-145 business jets. They will be augment by 12 refurbished P-3 Orions bought to patrol Brazil’s huge coast and maritime economic zone. The high end of the FAB’s fighter fleet, however, is inferior even when judged by regional standards. This might not be a huge concern if its neighbors possessed only short-range or limited capability fighters. Venezuela’s large defense expenditures, however, and especially its recent purchase of long-range, 4+ generation SU-30MK fighters instead of more clearly defensive alternatives like the MiG-29, appears to have had the effect of triggering countermoves in several quarters. Even so, Lula’s government is careful to stress that this is not about an arms race. Defense Minister Nelson Jobim reportedly said in a 2007 public speech that: “Brazil has well established, peaceful relations with all South American nations … one of our political priorities is economic and structural integration of the region … (and in 2008) we’ll also be strengthening our military links…. [Brazil cannot] neglect its defense. Therefore, we will increase our budget outlays and investment in the army, navy and air force by more than 50 percent…. [Brazil] is elaborating a national strategy defense plan that will determine each military branch’s mission and the equipment it needs for its activities”. According to official figures made public on Nov 4/07, Brazil has requested $5 billion for its 2008 defense budget, with the possibility of raising it to $5.64 billion. In 2007, Brazil’s military budget was around $3.5 billion. [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_AMX_Brazil_Armed_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] [I][CENTER]AMX light fighter[/CENTER][/I] President Lula da Silva’s administration has larger plans than just equipment recapitalization, saying that “we must overcome the lack of strategic planning and the technological dismantling of the last two decades.” The new National Defence Strategy group is designed to plan and execute the recovery of the “capability of our armed forces and the technological edge we once had in certain fields.” Brazil maintained an impressive niche capability during the 1970s and 1980s in areas like tank and armored vehicle design, rockets, missiles, and of course aircraft. Unfortunately, in a world divided by cold war allegiances, there was often little room for a non-aligned 3rd party exporter. While some projects like the Tucano succeeded, and others like the AMX enjoyed qualified success, many promising projects saw limited exports at best, or became failed efforts. The world is no longer divided into such camps, however, which may offer the Brazilian defense industry a second chance if it partners well and executes smartly. According to the main guidelines of the da Silva’s long term strategy, Brazilian defense industry should look to become a player again in the export of missiles, aircraft and other equipment. DID would be surprised if UAVs, with their long endurance surveillance capabilities and natural connection to Brazil’s aviation industry, didn’t also become a priority. The overal thrust of Brazil’s policies is certainly clear: “We must convince ourselves that we can become a world power this century,” says President Lula da Silva. [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/PUB_Brazils_Army_Amazon_1999_lg.jpg[/IMG] [I]Military Review, 1999[/I][/CENTER] On the one hand, these statements remind one of the old joke that goes: “Brazil is the nation of the future – and always will be.” On the other hand, anteing up with a 50% hike of the defense budget certainly displays seriousness, and Brazil has already set up a key partnership to develop the 5th generation A-Darter short range air-air missile with South Africa. A similar deal with Israel for its Derby/Alto radar guided missile is also expected at some point, and RFPs went out recently for a handful of medium transport helicopters (AW EH101, EADS EC725, Russian Mi-171V) and some attack helicopters (AW-TAI A129, EADS Tiger, Russian Mi-35M – which won). The giant may be stirring again. A handful of fighters and helicopters, plus ships to patrol its coasts, won’t exactly make anyone a world power – and Brazil has an equally urgent and unfilled need for transport aircraft. Still, these buys may go a long way toward ensuring the nation’s ability to patrol and enforce its long borders. The right deals may also allow Brazil to re-establish its faded indigenous defense industry on the world stage. [B]F-X2: The Competition[/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_Rafale-M_Launch_CVN-65_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] For this second round of the FX competition, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, and Sukhoi’s recently-unveiled SU-35 were all reported to be back in contention. All were expected to bid, and Boeing added its F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet. The FAB was also said to be interested in the Lockheed-Martin F-35, but the finalized nature of the Lighting’s industrial production partnership program was likely to keep the program from delivering the industrial offsets Brazil seeks. Meanwhile, a pair of competitors from earlier rounds faded out. Dassault’s Mirage 2000 production line was closing, and Brazil did not mention the F-16 as a contender – or advance Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR Block 70 offer to the finals. Reporter Tania Monteiro of the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo writes that technology transfer will be an essential part of any deal, and quotes influential Workers’ Party Deputy (PT is Lula’s party, Deputy = MP or Congressman) Jose Genoino as saying: “France is always the better partner. Concerning Russia, everyone knows the difficulties and we don’t know what is going to happen in ten years so that we will be able to guarantee our spare parts. The USA, traditionally, does not transfer technology…. We want to seek the lowest price with the most technology transfer.” If his assessment of Brazil’s priorities remains true, that country could represent a critical last chance for France to get some export momentum and success behind its Rafale, which has lost every competition it has entered thus far (Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, UAE, et. al.). To win, France will need to come up with a strong package. According to reports, the indications are that technology transfer will be more important than cost in terms of the final choice. Defence minister Nelson Jobim: “Whatever the final contract it must be closely linked to national development, to help advance in the creation of a strong defense industry and therefore the technological edge we are requesting.” [B]Analysis: F-X2, The Competitors[/B] Some quick handicapping follows. [B]Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS/European – eliminated): [/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_Eurofighter-RAF_Fires_ASRAAM_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] Technology transfer may prove to be an issue, but price was always likely to be the biggest one. Eurofighters consistently sell for $110-130 million, which doesn’t square well with $2.2 billion for 36 planes. The most capable air-air choice in the group would provide unquestioned regional air superiority, but ground surveillance and strike performance is still provisional (Tranche I v6), or unproven (Tranche 2+). This has been fatal in competitions like Singapore’s, and may have proven to be a handicap here. On the plus side, EADS Airbus offers a potent option for industrial offsets, and other EADS subsidiaries have footholds of their own. Airbus military’s A400M medium transport may create additional military nterest in a long term industrial partnership, and EADS Eurocopter’s Cougar has just become the medium-lift mainstay of Brazil’s future helicopter fleet. [B]JAS-39 Gripen (Saab/BAE)[/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_JAS-39_Gripen_Top_Smokewinders_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] Saab offers strong industrial partnerships, and has a record of successful technology transfer agreements. The next-generation Gripen Demo program offers key industrial opportunities, along with a high-performance, affordable fighter. Gripens can operate from highways if need be, which gives Brazil great flexibility in deploying them. They would also give Brazil’s Air Force commonality with A-Darter air-air missile missile partner and political ally South Africa, which operates JAS-39C/Ds. Selex Galileo’s Vixen 500 AESA radar will also be offered, leveraging that firm’s successful history with Brazil’s F-5BR (Grifo-F) and AMX (Scipio) fighter programs. These factors make Gripen a strong contender. Its F404/F414 engine offers the advantages of certain performance and a very broad customer base, but is subject to US export approvals if that’s an issue for Brazil. A more pressing weakness may be the fact that each plane only has one engine, since Brazil combines vast over-water areas and even vaster wilderness areas to patrol. Those requirements usually translate into a focus on range and 2-engine safety, which have worked against Gripen in other competitions. Most of Brazil’s other fighters (Tucano ALX, AMX, Mirage 2000) have just one engine, however, so it’s a question of how the RFP requirements are set. To date, it does not seem to be a problem. [B]F-35 Lightning II/ F-16BR (Lockheed Martin – eliminated)[/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_F-35B_JSF_STOVL_Landing_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] F-35 industrial partnership and technology transfer issues proved too difficult to overcome, so Lockheed is offering an F-16BR instead. It will probably resemble the F-16E/F “Block 70” variant being offered to India, with an AESA radar and built-in IRST/targeting sensors, an uprated engine, et. al. Both India and Brazil are fond of Israeli avionics and weapons, so those aspects are also likely to be common to both offers. The F-16BR offers shares many of the Super Hornet’s perceived benefits and drawbacks: AESA radar and sensors and weaker American dollar on the plus side, poorer aerodynamic performance and distrust of America as an interfering supplier on the minus side. The F-16 cannot play the carrier-compatible card like the Super Hornet, and offers only a single-engine design. On the other hand, it does offer wide compatibility with other regional and global air forces, and its cost is significantly lower. The F-35 would have offered a clear set of performance benefits over competing aircraft. No aircraft in this group could have matched the Lightning’s advanced surveillance capabilities, and surveillance is a big need in Brazil. The F-35B STOVL variant also offered Brazil the ability to operate from small, dispersed runways, and it would have been perfect for aircraft carriers like Brazil’s Sao Paolo (ex-Foch). Unfortunately, technology transfer issues were not the F-35’s only problem. Other barriers to an F-35 win included questions surrounding air-air performance against Venezuela’s SU-30MKs, the low likelihood of deliveries before 2016, and its single engine design. [B]Rafale (Dassault)[/B] Despite its past history of failure in international competitions, the Rafale has a lot of advantages in this competition. It can play the carrier-compatible card, since the Sao Paolo was once FNS Foch. Experience with the Mirage 2000 offers a common technological and training base, and France is seen as a good supplier who avoids political interference and makes good on technology transfers. The one real negative is the Rafale’s narrow range of integrated weapons – but offers of partnerships in some of those areas might serve to hit 2 targets at once by playing the tech transfer card more strongly. Since Dassault really, really needs this deal, they should be very motivated on price. If they can’t make it here, they may not be able to make it anywhere. [B]SU-35 (Sukhoi/ Rosoboronexport – eliminated?) [/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_Su35b_KnAAPO_Pic_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] This was the aircraft Russia offered in the last round. Russian tech transfer is trusted. Lack of political interference is trusted absolutely. The aircraft itself offers an option that’s slightly better than the SU-30MK, but still presents itself to the region as an equivalency move. The price will be good, and Sukhoi has some support in the air force. On the other hand, service and parts delivery are almost guaranteed to be bad. That gives the FAB real pause. One way around that is to offer licensed local production, though it would have to extend to the aircraft’s NPO Saturn engines and fitted avionics, in order to solve the Russian service problem1. [B]F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Block II (Boeing)[/B] [CENTER][IMG]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_F-18E_Super_Hornet_Parked_lg.jpg[/IMG][/CENTER] The Super Hornet shares the carrier-compatible card with Dassault’s Rafale, but compatibility with a smaller carrier like the Sao Paolo would have to be established. Boeing also shares a key advantage with EADS’ Eurofighter when it comes to industrial offsets, thanks to Boeing’s passenger aircraft division. The Block II version’s proven APG-79 AESA radar offers Brazil an attractive technology, and a weaker American dollar makes American exports more affordable. On the flip side, the Super Hornet offers poorer aerodynamic performance than other competitors, falling behind in areas like maneuverability, acceleration, etc. This weakness is compounded by the fact that Super Hornets sell for about $75-90 million each, placing them above the Gripen, F-16 E/F+, and the SU-35, but below the Eurofighter. Concerns about America’s propensity to use arms export bans as a political lever add a final complication to the Super Hornet’s odds. [B]Updates and Key Events[/B] April 6/09: Competition re-opened? Russia’s RIA Novosti quotes Alexander Fomin, deputy director of Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation: “We are actively participating in the Brazilian tender, which has been reopened. It involves over 100 fighter planes. Russia has made a bid in the tender with its Su-35 multirole fighter. The tender has stiff requirements, involving not only the sale, but also the transfer of technology. It is a key condition of the deal and Russia is ready to satisfy it…. We are discussing with the well-known Brazilian company Embraer the transfer of technology and the construction of facilities for the future licensed production of the aircraft…” Fomin reportedly added that such a facility could also produce the 5th generation PAK-FA fighter being developed in conjunction with India. Experiences with the American F-22 and F-35 suggest that this would depend on the sophistication of the facilities. Stealth fighters require new equipment and techniques that go beyond normal aircraft construction standards, and a facility set up to produce even 4+ generation fighters may not be adequate. March 30/09: The Brazilian Air force announces [in Portuguese] that it is beginning visits and technical evaluation of the 3 finalists. This evaluation will include test flights, and evaluation of the bids’ technical, industrial and maintenance offerings. March 24/09: Dassault’s acquisition of a large stake in Thales led to Thales’ refusal to sell Saab the RBE2 AESA radar beyond the Gripen Demo stage. In response, Saab and SELEX Galileo sign an agreement to develop an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for the JAS-39NG. The arrangement is initially aimed at Brazil’s fighter competition, where it leverages Selex Galileo’s strong pedigree equipping Brazil’s F-5BR fighters (Grifo-F radar) and AMX light attack jets (Scipio radar). Once integrated and proven, however, the AESA upgrade would be available to any Gripen customer. Per Aviation Week’s March 10/09 report from Aero India, the radar will use a Vixen 500 AESA front end, with “back end” modules from the existing PS-05/A. Using those back end modules simplifies integration, and also avoids the control issues inherent in American alternatives. As it happens, the 2 firms have a long history of radar partnerships. Ericsson (now Saab’s) partner on the original PS-05/A was Ferranti, which became GEC-Marconi, then BAE Systems, and now Selex Galileo. Selex was also Saab’s partner in the recent M-AESA R&D project. The Vixen 500 AESA radar is currently used in the USA by border surveillance aircraft, but it has yet to see service on a fighter. Korea’s F/A-50 was recently barred from using the Vixen 500E, under an agreement with co-developer Lockheed Martin that did not allow the F/A-50’s capabilities to surpass the ROKAF’s F-16s. Saab | Gripen International. Feb 2/09: Bids are in. Boeing confirms that it has submitted a bid involving 36 F/A-18 Super Hornet Block IIs, with the APG-79 AESA radar. Gripen International confirms a bid involving 36 JAS-39NG aircraft, with longer range, AESA radars, and other enhancements. Their release adds that Brazil will have “direct involvement in the development, production and maintenance of the platform but it will also generate transfer of key technology including access to Gripen source codes.” It is presumed that Dassault also submitted a 36-plane bid for its Rafale fighter. Boeing release | Gripen International release. November 2008: Russia and Brazil sign a series of agreements on military technology cooperation. As is customary, the agreements set out protocols for the protection of intellectual property rights and technology secrets, which make joint ventures and local production easier to manage. Source. Oct 30/08: RFP is out. Brazil’s FAB formally issues the RFP to the short-listed competitors. The 3 firms will have until Feb 2/09 to present their proposals, which must include operational, logistic, industrial, commercial, technical, commercial compensation (offset) and technology transfer details. FAB release [Portuguese]. Oct 1/08: Brazil has decided on its 3 finalists: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, and Saab/BAE’s JAS-39 Gripen. EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all failed to make the cut. Brazilian FAB release [Portuguese] | Reuters | Boeing release | Gripen International release. Aug 27/08: Defesanet reports that Lockheed Martin will be offering an F-16BR for Brazil’s F-X2, rather than the F-35. The report adds that barriers to technology transfer of some F-35 systems played a role in this decision. Defesanet [Portuguese] | Forecast International. July 30/08: Boeing delivers a detailed proposal July 30 offering its advanced F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet to the Brazilian Air Force. The aircraft would be similar to the F/A-18Fs ordered by the Royal Australian Air Force, and would include Raytheon’s APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar. Boeing release. June 12/08: Boeing (and presumably other manufacturers) receive the Brazilian RFP. The stated initial requirement is for 36 aircraft, with the potential for up to 120 aircraft. Boeing release | FAB statment (Brazilian air force). January 2008: Brazil’s President Lula formally authorizes Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the F-X program. November 2007: Brazil’s decision to hold an “F-X2” competition is announced by the Brazilian press. Footnotes 1 Russian firms tend to partner due to local political necessity, or to gain technologies/ quality level they do not have, rather than as a strategic option for penetrating new markets. In Brazil’s case, one logical option would be a partnership with India to offer the thrust-vectoring, canard-winged SU-30MKI, which is arguably superior to the SU-35. The aircraft are partly produced in India, and already have obvious slots for tech transfer because that was built into the Indian program. A 3-way deal leveraging India’s HAL, and setting up an NPO Saturn engine plant in Brazil, would have offered several benefits. It would offer India and other SU-30 customers a welcome second engine source, even as Brazil’s aerospace industry receives a critical additional puzzle piece in engine construction, the FAB removes the biggest historical problem with Russian planes, and Russia substantially strengthens its lobbying effort. On the avionics and electronics front, Elbit Systems avionics could be sourced from the Brazilian subsidiary AEL to offer fleet commonality, and some can be found in the SU-30MKI already. Indian electronics used in the SU-30MKI would offer additional options for international cooperation and license production, alongside Israeli options that already equip Brazilian aircraft. The question is whether the Russians were ever good enough at partnering to pull something like that off, or were even willing to try. [URL="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com"]http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com[/URL] [/QUOTE]
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