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<blockquote data-quote="SMS" data-source="post: 2507901" data-attributes="member: 17858">&quot;OPERATION SEA LION&quot;-PLANNED INVASION OF ENGLAND 325 We in the Navy doubted that we could establish conditions that would guarantee even reasonably safe protection for a crossing of the Channel by the invasion forces. Circumstances were entirely different from those in the Norway campaign. There, surprise had been a most important factor in the operation, and even though complete surprise had not been attained, the magnitude of the operation and the wide spread of the movement among so many ports, all occupied simultaneously, had been beyond the power of the enemy to anticipate. But in the case of England, no such surprise was possible. The major part of the transport vessels we possessed were craft designed for our inland waterways and were not equal even to limited voyages in the open sea. Many, in fact, did not even have their own means of propulsion and had to be towed. To be ready in time, they would have to be assembled in the embarkation ports at the same time that the invasion troops were being assembled in the same localities. Such extensive movements could not be kept hidden from the enemy's air reconnaissance, not to speak of the very active intelligence agents he had throughout the whole occupied territory. Hence this powerful and desperate opponent, lying just across the Channel and knowing that his very existence was at stake, would not only have advance notice of the invasion, but would be able with great accuracy to figure out just where such a landing had to take place, and consequently to meet it with his entire defensive force. It could not be expected that even for a brief period our Air Force could make up for our lack of naval supremacy. Yet if this most important requisite could not be fulfilled nor all of the others, then the Navy faced an impossible task. (Erich Raeder)</blockquote>

[QUOTE="SMS, post: 2507901, member: 17858"] "OPERATION SEA LION"-PLANNED INVASION OF ENGLAND 325 We in the Navy doubted that we could establish conditions that would guarantee even reasonably safe protection for a crossing of the Channel by the invasion forces. Circumstances were entirely different from those in the Norway campaign. There, surprise had been a most important factor in the operation, and even though complete surprise had not been attained, the magnitude of the operation and the wide spread of the movement among so many ports, all occupied simultaneously, had been beyond the power of the enemy to anticipate. But in the case of England, no such surprise was possible. The major part of the transport vessels we possessed were craft designed for our inland waterways and were not equal even to limited voyages in the open sea. Many, in fact, did not even have their own means of propulsion and had to be towed. To be ready in time, they would have to be assembled in the embarkation ports at the same time that the invasion troops were being assembled in the same localities. Such extensive movements could not be kept hidden from the enemy's air reconnaissance, not to speak of the very active intelligence agents he had throughout the whole occupied territory. Hence this powerful and desperate opponent, lying just across the Channel and knowing that his very existence was at stake, would not only have advance notice of the invasion, but would be able with great accuracy to figure out just where such a landing had to take place, and consequently to meet it with his entire defensive force. It could not be expected that even for a brief period our Air Force could make up for our lack of naval supremacy. Yet if this most important requisite could not be fulfilled nor all of the others, then the Navy faced an impossible task. (Erich Raeder) [/QUOTE]

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