Digamos que si...
Rumores y discusión sobre el próximo multirrol que no fue para la FAA
- Tema iniciado Cocker
- Fecha de inicio
De forma, casi.
Bueno, si, pero depende para qué quieras que digamos que sí.
Es que en realidad,si bien ambos aparatos son capaces de cumplir las mismas funciones,para mi(recalco,para mi) serían complementarios.
Yo y vuelvo a recalcar ,yo, los utilizaría(salvando las distancias) como Israel utiliza el binomio F-16/F-15.
Que?Miche...
Tal vez macri tenga mejor relaciom com china q cfk ... a no olvidarse de papi eh?
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Micheeee...
A menos que conversamos a Kazakistan que nos vendan algunos junto a algunos de los rusos. Habría que ver en que estado están. Personalmente el Mig-31 me parece un excelente caza interceptor.
No se si ya lo subieron, pero leyendo lo que escribieron sobre los misiles BVR, decididamente el AIM-7 Sparrow no era muy bueno.
Tiraron 3 y recien el último pego a solo 5NM...el otro Mig-23 lo bajan con un Sidewinder AIM-9L.
Lo otro interesante cuando hablan del Mig-31 volando en la Estratoputosfera, aca los F-14 bajaron a 3000 ft!!!!
O sea, los 40000 ft o más es solo para recco o para ferry...sino te dejan ahí arriba y te pasan todos por abajo!!!
http://www.helicopterschoolsdirecto...ogfight-Footage-F-14-Tomcat-vs-Libyan-MiG-23/
Declassified Dogfight Footage F-14 Tomcat vs Libyan MiG-23
Craig Rogers
This video shows the 1989 Gulf of Sidra encounter between two F-14 Tomcats of the USS John F. Kennedy andtwo MiG-23 Floggers of Libya. Unsurprisingly, the Tomcats come out on top. As you watch the video, be patient- it takes a bit before the situation gets "real". As the incident unfolds the situation gets more and more intense. At about the 5 minute mark, it gets serious (perhaps you should fast forward to the 5 minute mark).
The unedited gun camera footage and audio from a 1989 dogfight between U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats vs. Libyan MiG-23 Floggers. As it gets real intense at the end, you get a first hand experience of what it is like in a real dogfight. You can do all the training in the world but in the intensity of a battle all hell can break loose.
Video: Declassified Dogfight Footage F-14 Tomcat vs Libyan MiG-23 (be patient)
This video depicts the second Gulf of Sidra incident, which occurred on 4 January 1989 when two United States Navy F-14 Tomcats shot down two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers. The Floggers appeared to have been attempting to engage them, as had happened eight years prior in the first Gulf of Sidra incident, in 1981.
The Facts Surrounding the Engagement
On the morning of 4 January 1989, the Kennedy battle group was operating some 130 km north of Libya, with a group of A-6 Intruders on exercise south of Crete, escorted by two pairs of F-14As from VF-14 and VF-32, and as well as an E-2C from VAW-126.
Later that morning the southernmost Combat Air Patrol station was taken by two F-14s from VF-32, (CDR Joseph Bernard Connelly/CDR Leo F. Enwright in BuNo 159610, 'AC207') and (LT Hermon C. Cook III/LCDR Steven Patrick Collins in BuNo 159437, 'AC202'). The officers had been specially briefed for this mission due to the high tensions regarding the carrier group's presence; the pilots were advised to expect some kind of hostilities.
At 11:50 a.m., after some time on patrol, the E-2 informed the F-14 crews that four Libyan MiG-23s had taken off from Al Bumbah airfield, near Tobruk. The F-14s from VF-32 turned towards the first two MiG-23s (Floggers) some 50 km ahead of the second pair and acquired them on radar, while the Tomcats from VF-14 stayed with the A-6 group. At the time the Floggers were 72 nautical miles (133 km) away at 10,000 feet (3,000 m) and heading directly towards the Tomcats and carrier. The F-14s turned away from the head-on approach to indicate that they were not attempting to engage. The Floggers changed course to intercept at a closing speed of about 870 knots (1,610 km/h). The F-14s descended to 3,000 ft (910 m) to give them a clear radar picture of the Floggers against the sky and leave the Floggers with sea clutter to contend with. Four more times the F-14s turned away from the approaching MiGs. Each time the Libyan aircraft turned in to continue to close. At 11:59 the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) of the lead Tomcat ordered the arming of the AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow missiles it was carrying. The E-2C had given the F-14 crews authority to fire if threatened; the F-14 crews did not have to wait until after the Libyans opened fire.
At almost 12:01 the lead Tomcat RIO said that "Bogeys have jinked back at me again for the fifth time. They're on my nose now, inside of 20 miles", followed shortly by "Master arm on" as he ordered arming of the weapons. At a range of 14 nautical miles (26 km) the RIO of the lead F-14A fired the first AIM-7M Sparrow; he surprised his pilot, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from his Tomcat. The RIO reported "Fox 1. Fox 1." The Sparrow failed to track because of a wrong switch-setting. At 10 nautical miles (19 km), he launched a second Sparrow missile, but it also failed to track its target.
The Floggers accelerated and continued to approach. At 6 nautical miles (11 km) the Tomcats split and the Floggers followed the wingman while the lead Tomcat circled to get a tail angle on them. The wingman fired a third Sparrow from 5 nautical miles (9.3 km) and downed one of the Libyan aircraft. The lead Tomcat by now had gained the rear quadrant on the final Flogger. After closing to 1.5 nautical miles (2.8 km) the pilot fired a Sidewinder, which hit its target. The Tomcats proceeded north to return to the carrier group. The Libyan pilots were both seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but the Libyan Air Force was unable to recover them.
The Aftermath
It is unknown why the two MiGs operated in this manner, or why the Libyans did not launch a successful rescue operation to recover the pilots. The following day, the Libyans accused the US of attacking two unarmed reconnaissance planes, but the footage, also called the gun-camera videos, showed that the Libyans had been armed with AA-7 Apex missiles. Depending on the model, this can be either a semi-active radar-homing missile or an infrared-homing (heat-seeking) missile. Identifications of the Tomcats vary and the narrative above used the details from Air Aces.[2] However, another source identifies the wingman as AC202 rather than AC204.[3] Both agree on AC207 as the lead.
Tiraron 3 y recien el último pego a solo 5NM...el otro Mig-23 lo bajan con un Sidewinder AIM-9L.
Lo otro interesante cuando hablan del Mig-31 volando en la Estratoputosfera, aca los F-14 bajaron a 3000 ft!!!!
O sea, los 40000 ft o más es solo para recco o para ferry...sino te dejan ahí arriba y te pasan todos por abajo!!!
http://www.helicopterschoolsdirecto...ogfight-Footage-F-14-Tomcat-vs-Libyan-MiG-23/
Declassified Dogfight Footage F-14 Tomcat vs Libyan MiG-23
Craig Rogers
This video shows the 1989 Gulf of Sidra encounter between two F-14 Tomcats of the USS John F. Kennedy andtwo MiG-23 Floggers of Libya. Unsurprisingly, the Tomcats come out on top. As you watch the video, be patient- it takes a bit before the situation gets "real". As the incident unfolds the situation gets more and more intense. At about the 5 minute mark, it gets serious (perhaps you should fast forward to the 5 minute mark).
The unedited gun camera footage and audio from a 1989 dogfight between U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats vs. Libyan MiG-23 Floggers. As it gets real intense at the end, you get a first hand experience of what it is like in a real dogfight. You can do all the training in the world but in the intensity of a battle all hell can break loose.
Video: Declassified Dogfight Footage F-14 Tomcat vs Libyan MiG-23 (be patient)
This video depicts the second Gulf of Sidra incident, which occurred on 4 January 1989 when two United States Navy F-14 Tomcats shot down two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers. The Floggers appeared to have been attempting to engage them, as had happened eight years prior in the first Gulf of Sidra incident, in 1981.
The Facts Surrounding the Engagement
On the morning of 4 January 1989, the Kennedy battle group was operating some 130 km north of Libya, with a group of A-6 Intruders on exercise south of Crete, escorted by two pairs of F-14As from VF-14 and VF-32, and as well as an E-2C from VAW-126.
Later that morning the southernmost Combat Air Patrol station was taken by two F-14s from VF-32, (CDR Joseph Bernard Connelly/CDR Leo F. Enwright in BuNo 159610, 'AC207') and (LT Hermon C. Cook III/LCDR Steven Patrick Collins in BuNo 159437, 'AC202'). The officers had been specially briefed for this mission due to the high tensions regarding the carrier group's presence; the pilots were advised to expect some kind of hostilities.
At 11:50 a.m., after some time on patrol, the E-2 informed the F-14 crews that four Libyan MiG-23s had taken off from Al Bumbah airfield, near Tobruk. The F-14s from VF-32 turned towards the first two MiG-23s (Floggers) some 50 km ahead of the second pair and acquired them on radar, while the Tomcats from VF-14 stayed with the A-6 group. At the time the Floggers were 72 nautical miles (133 km) away at 10,000 feet (3,000 m) and heading directly towards the Tomcats and carrier. The F-14s turned away from the head-on approach to indicate that they were not attempting to engage. The Floggers changed course to intercept at a closing speed of about 870 knots (1,610 km/h). The F-14s descended to 3,000 ft (910 m) to give them a clear radar picture of the Floggers against the sky and leave the Floggers with sea clutter to contend with. Four more times the F-14s turned away from the approaching MiGs. Each time the Libyan aircraft turned in to continue to close. At 11:59 the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) of the lead Tomcat ordered the arming of the AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow missiles it was carrying. The E-2C had given the F-14 crews authority to fire if threatened; the F-14 crews did not have to wait until after the Libyans opened fire.
At almost 12:01 the lead Tomcat RIO said that "Bogeys have jinked back at me again for the fifth time. They're on my nose now, inside of 20 miles", followed shortly by "Master arm on" as he ordered arming of the weapons. At a range of 14 nautical miles (26 km) the RIO of the lead F-14A fired the first AIM-7M Sparrow; he surprised his pilot, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from his Tomcat. The RIO reported "Fox 1. Fox 1." The Sparrow failed to track because of a wrong switch-setting. At 10 nautical miles (19 km), he launched a second Sparrow missile, but it also failed to track its target.
The Floggers accelerated and continued to approach. At 6 nautical miles (11 km) the Tomcats split and the Floggers followed the wingman while the lead Tomcat circled to get a tail angle on them. The wingman fired a third Sparrow from 5 nautical miles (9.3 km) and downed one of the Libyan aircraft. The lead Tomcat by now had gained the rear quadrant on the final Flogger. After closing to 1.5 nautical miles (2.8 km) the pilot fired a Sidewinder, which hit its target. The Tomcats proceeded north to return to the carrier group. The Libyan pilots were both seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but the Libyan Air Force was unable to recover them.
The Aftermath
It is unknown why the two MiGs operated in this manner, or why the Libyans did not launch a successful rescue operation to recover the pilots. The following day, the Libyans accused the US of attacking two unarmed reconnaissance planes, but the footage, also called the gun-camera videos, showed that the Libyans had been armed with AA-7 Apex missiles. Depending on the model, this can be either a semi-active radar-homing missile or an infrared-homing (heat-seeking) missile. Identifications of the Tomcats vary and the narrative above used the details from Air Aces.[2] However, another source identifies the wingman as AC202 rather than AC204.[3] Both agree on AC207 as the lead.
Captain Mikhail Myagkiy and its WSO were able to achieve a SR-71 lock-on at 52.000ft and at a distance of 120km from the target.
The Foxhound climbed at 65.676ft where the crew had the Blackbird in singt and according to Myagkiy:
"Had the spy plane violated Soviet airspace a live missile launch would have been carried out. There was no practically chance the aircraft coult avoid an R-33 missile."
http://theaviationist.com/2013/12/11/sr-71-vs-mig-31/
65.676ft son 20.000m armado con misiles.
Confirmado por los pilotos de Eagle:
"The MiG-31 had just deployed to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and we had intelligence reports telling us that one had made a run from Vladivostok to Sakhalin at 70.000ft and Mach 2,3. They told us that his load out was two radar missiles and four infrarred (IR) missiles. It was pretty eye-opening to know that he had enough gas to make that run AND carry his missiles."
Del libro: F-15C Eagles Units in Combat.
Recalco que el Foxhound no sólo realizó ese viaje a 21.000m sino que lo hizo a Mach 2,3 con su carga de 6 misiles. Pero además entre Vladivostok y Sakhalin hay una distancia de 1.210km!
Un avión fantástico.
Saludos
The Foxhound climbed at 65.676ft where the crew had the Blackbird in singt and according to Myagkiy:
"Had the spy plane violated Soviet airspace a live missile launch would have been carried out. There was no practically chance the aircraft coult avoid an R-33 missile."
http://theaviationist.com/2013/12/11/sr-71-vs-mig-31/
65.676ft son 20.000m armado con misiles.
Confirmado por los pilotos de Eagle:
"The MiG-31 had just deployed to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and we had intelligence reports telling us that one had made a run from Vladivostok to Sakhalin at 70.000ft and Mach 2,3. They told us that his load out was two radar missiles and four infrarred (IR) missiles. It was pretty eye-opening to know that he had enough gas to make that run AND carry his missiles."
Del libro: F-15C Eagles Units in Combat.
Recalco que el Foxhound no sólo realizó ese viaje a 21.000m sino que lo hizo a Mach 2,3 con su carga de 6 misiles. Pero además entre Vladivostok y Sakhalin hay una distancia de 1.210km!
Un avión fantástico.
Saludos
En la misma cita te respondes Comet.
Los Tomcat estaban en un ejercicio, y buscaron evitar el encuentro. Bajaron para intentar salirse del radar de los Migs.
No exactamente:
"to give them a clear radar picture of the Floggers against the sky and leave the Floggers with sea clutter to contend with"
"para darles una imagen radar clara de los Floggers contra el cielo, y dejar a los Floggers contendiendo con el eco del mar" (clutter, o entiendo, el eco radar que generan las olas)
Bajan para complicarles la adquisicion, buscaron antes de evitar un encuentro, y lo hicieron 5 veces, mientras los Migs volvian a corregir el rumbo para interceptarlos.
"to give them a clear radar picture of the Floggers against the sky and leave the Floggers with sea clutter to contend with"
"para darles una imagen radar clara de los Floggers contra el cielo, y dejar a los Floggers contendiendo con el eco del mar" (clutter, o entiendo, el eco radar que generan las olas)
Bajan para complicarles la adquisicion, buscaron antes de evitar un encuentro, y lo hicieron 5 veces, mientras los Migs volvian a corregir el rumbo para interceptarlos.
Además los que estaban en ejercicio eran los A-6 Intruder, los F-14 eran escolta con armamento vivo porque les estaban mojando la oreja a los libios. Los americanos solo reconocen soberanía dentro de las 5 NM de la Costa...el resto es para ellos no internacional.
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La conclusión del relato es incorrecta.
Los Tomcats no bajan para que no les pasen por abajo, lo hacen por procedimiento.
Desde la altura de patrulla enganchan frontalmente (lo que indica que no piensan utilizar los Phoenix) y luego se desenganchan alejando el morro de los MiGs.
Eso es una advertencia y un piloto que valore su salud giraría en redondo alejándose.
Pero no, los libios hacen exactamente lo contrario enfrentando a los Tomcats.
Los Tomcats descienden y repiten el procedimiento otras 4 veces. Todo tiene un límite.
Mal el RIO líder que realiza mal los lanzamietos de los Sparrows y NO le avisa al piloto.
Peor los pilotos libios, que evidentemente no sabían ruso, porque el manual del Flogger recomienda no enfrentar frontalmente al F-15 (ergo al F-14 tampoco) y prohíbe a los controladores del GCI dirigir frontalmente al MiG-23 contra un objetivo no identificado (porque puede ser un Eagle).
Al Tomcat no se lo pudía pasar por abajo se intentaba (los soviéticos) pasar por arriba.
Saludos
Los Tomcats no bajan para que no les pasen por abajo, lo hacen por procedimiento.
Desde la altura de patrulla enganchan frontalmente (lo que indica que no piensan utilizar los Phoenix) y luego se desenganchan alejando el morro de los MiGs.
Eso es una advertencia y un piloto que valore su salud giraría en redondo alejándose.
Pero no, los libios hacen exactamente lo contrario enfrentando a los Tomcats.
Los Tomcats descienden y repiten el procedimiento otras 4 veces. Todo tiene un límite.
Mal el RIO líder que realiza mal los lanzamietos de los Sparrows y NO le avisa al piloto.
Peor los pilotos libios, que evidentemente no sabían ruso, porque el manual del Flogger recomienda no enfrentar frontalmente al F-15 (ergo al F-14 tampoco) y prohíbe a los controladores del GCI dirigir frontalmente al MiG-23 contra un objetivo no identificado (porque puede ser un Eagle).
Al Tomcat no se lo pudía pasar por abajo se intentaba (los soviéticos) pasar por arriba.
Saludos
Cemento Rápido ?
Estas seguro ?
Mientras tanto .... los Typhoon que hacen ? ayudan a secar el cemento rápido con sus toberas ?
Respecto a la intercepcion ... el Forista especialista asseguro que a esa altura es muy difícil la intercepcion. Conociendo las capacidades del aparato, desde los tempos de la Guerra Fria, te diria que el forista esta acertado ...
Y los " Tommies " ... los van a lanzar desde Faslane, en Escocia ? O van a destinar en dotacion permanente dos " Astute " para Malvinas ?
Te das cuenta que se trata de un " juego " interesante ?
Hasta hicieron una brigada en honor al Kfy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kfir_Brigade
Necias las almas que no quieren abrazar la realidad
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kfir_Brigade
Necias las almas que no quieren abrazar la realidad
Azul140
Colaborador
Y qué tiene que ver una Brigada de infantería con el injerto aéreo?
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