De panza. Ligera traslación horizontal
Accidentes en la Aviación Civil
- Tema iniciado spirit666
- Fecha de inicio
es porque no es una ofensa y si una giria. No hay como traducir en el sentido literal.Te faltó la última palabra kkk.
Gracias..siempre tuve en la cabeza que fueron de nariz y con potencia al piso por el tema de la desorientación y los tubos, no que habian perdido sustentación..
Error humano, embanderamiento de las helices confundiendo los comandos con los de flaps.
Son las dos teorias que se manejan, condiciones de engelamiento o embanderamiento accidental. Esperemos las cajas negras tengan las respuestas.
Quisieron salir de la pérdida con potencia, creo que esa es la filosofía Airbus.. En un momento dado un piloto quería ponerlo en picada y otro nariz arriba, simultáneamente.
Creo que @cosmiccomet74 debe tener presente este tema.
La técnica de recuperación de stall de Airbus desde que lo vuelo, Enero 2011 a la fecha, es:
1ro) Disminuir el ángulo de ataque
2do) Nivelar las alas
3ro) Chequear que los spoilers esten retractados
.....................................................................................................
4to) Una vez que el avión este fuera del stall incrementar el empuje en forma progresiva.
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Si se esta volando por debajo de los 20 mil pies, selectar FLAP 1.
La recuperación que vos haces referencia era la que haciamos con el Boeing B747-400.
Ante la alarma de stall se hacia el call out correspondiente, en AIRBUS es "STALL I HAVE CONTROL", y empujabas los cuatro thurst levers al limite delantero de las mismas. En forma jocosa se llama POTENCIA PARALLAMAS. Y se pasaba a volar una indicación que aparecia en el PFD (Pilot Display Unit) que son los EYEBROWS. El problema de volar esa indicación, una barra horizontal, que era una actitud en el PFD, que si bien disminuia la pérdida de altura si se volaba en forma precisa....era muy dificil de volar.
Si volabas un milímetro por encima de la indicación de la barra, SEGUIS EN STALL, y tenes a su vez el stick shaker. Ahora si volabas 1 milímetro por debajo de la indicación de la barra no estas en stall pero el avión pierde altura.
En verdad en vista de las experiencias, lo primero que hay que hacer en un stall es lo mismo que se hace en un Piper PA-11. El principio de generación de sustentación es el mismo desde los aviones de los hermanos Wright al F/A-35C.
El dar potencia/empuje en forma agresiva durante la recuperación del stall en aviones con los motores por debajo del centro de gravedad creara un momento que hara que se incremente el ángulo de ataque....con lo cual se opone a la acción que debe realizar el piloto para que el ala vuelva a generar sustentación, disminuir el ángulo de ataque.
Última edición:
Hay que esperar el informe preliminar para saber que paso y ahi podemos discutir. No me animo a dar una opinion sin tener más elementos.
Este vídeo me llamó la atención. Desconozco los conocimientos del joven youtuber "ingeniero espacial", quien en todo caso adelanta una hipótesis que señala no necesariamente es lo que ocurrió. Basicamente dice que el avión atravesó una zona de formación de hielo que a los pilotos les fue informada y que sin perjuicio del sistema del avión contra el hielo, se puede haber formado hielo en el plano de cola, cambiando el centro de gravedad y dificultando la operación de los elevadores. Yo ni idea.
En algún momento lograron bajar la nariz, por unos segundos, pero después otra vez queda casi nivelado. Es raro.
Viendo los sistemas automatizados, y comparando la grafica que muestra un descenso y recuperacion de altura antes del evento final... me pregunto si sera otro caso de tripulacion peleando con los sistemas de la aeronave.
Hace unos días (jueves me parece) en Jornal Nacional, noticiero de la noche de TV Globo, pasaron parte de la grabación ee cabina y ahí salió que el primer oficial (piloto al mando parece), pidió más potencia.
No hicieron ninguna llamada de emergencia y luego fue un minuto y pico de ruidos y muchos gritos.
En en el sitio g1 (también de la Globo) circuló la versión que en caso de engelamiento el ART 72 desciende en espiral. Supuestamente eso dice el manual del avión.
No hicieron ninguna llamada de emergencia y luego fue un minuto y pico de ruidos y muchos gritos.
En en el sitio g1 (también de la Globo) circuló la versión que en caso de engelamiento el ART 72 desciende en espiral. Supuestamente eso dice el manual del avión.
Crash: Voepass AT72 at Sao Paulo on Aug 9th 2024, spun out of control and lost height (avherald.com)
On Sep 6th 2024 CENIPA released their preliminary report summarizing the sequence of events:
Based on the information collected during the initial action, as well as the recordings from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Investigation Commission identified the sequence ofevents that preceded the collision of the aircraft with the ground. To record the times described in this field, Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) was used as a reference.
14:58:05 - the aircraft began takeoff from runway 15 of SBCA, with 58 passengers and 4 crew members onboard;
15:12:40 – PROPELLER ANTI-ICING 1 and 2 were turned on;
15:14:56 - the Electronic Ice Detector connected to the Centralized Crew Alert System (CCAS) displayed awarning signal when crossing FL130;
15:15:03 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;
15:15:42 - a single chime was heard in the cabin. The crew then reported that a Fault message had occurred on the DE-ICING AIRFRAME;
15:15:49 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off;
15:16:25 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
15:17:08 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
15:19:13 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
15:23:43 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
15:30:05 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
16:11:02 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
16:12:41 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
16:12:55 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
16:15:16 - the Second in Command (SIC) made radio contact with the airline's operational dispatcher at Guarulhos airfield, in order to carry out the necessary coordination for his arrival;
16:16:25 - at the same time as the coordination with the operational dispatcher, a flight attendant wascalled over the intercom. The SIC asked her to wait a moment and continued communication with thedispatcher;
16:17:20 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal. At that moment, the SIC wasrequesting information from the flight attendant in order to transmit it to the operational dispatcher;
16:17:32 - The Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal. At this time, the Pilot in Command (PIC)was informing the passengers about the conditions and the estimated time for landing at SBGR;
16:17:41 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;
16:18:41 - at 191 kt speed, the CRUISE SPEED LOW alert was displayed. Simultaneously, the SIC was finishing passing on some information to the operational dispatch;
16:18:47 - the PIC began the approach briefing for landing at SBGR. Concomitantly, São Paulo Approach Control (APP-SP) made a call and instructed him to change to frequency 123.25 MHz;
16:18:55 - a single chime was heard in the cabin. Simultaneously, communication with APP-SP was taking place;
16:19:07 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off;
16:19:16 - the crew made a call on frequency 123.25 MHz to APP-SP;
16:19:19 - APP-SP requested that PS-VPB maintain FL170 due to traffic;
16:19:23 - the crew responded to APP-SP that they would maintain the flight level and that they were at theideal descent point, a
authorization;
16:19:28 - at 184 kt speed, the DEGRADED PERFORMANCE alert was displayed, along with a single chime. The alarm was triggered concomitantly with the message exchanges between APP-SP and the crew;
16:19:30 - APP-SP said they were aware and asked to wait for authorization;
16:19:31 - Passaredo 2283 said he was aware and thanked us;
16:19:33 - the PIC continued to carry out the approach briefing ;
16:20:00 - SIC commented: “a lot of ice”;
16:20:05 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on for the third time;
16:20:33 - APP-SP authorized the aircraft to fly directly to the SANPA position, maintaining FL170. Itinformed that the descent would be authorized in two minutes;
16:20:39 - the crew compared the previous message (last communication made by the crew);
16:20:50 - the aircraft began a right turn towards the SANPA position heading;
16:20:57 - during the turn, at 169 kt speed, the INCREASE SPEED alert was displayed, together with a single chime. Immediately afterwards, vibration noises began in the aircraft, together with the activation of the stall alarm ;
16:21:09 - control of the aircraft was lost and it entered an abnormal flight attitude until it collided with theground. At this point, the aircraft tilted 52º to the left and then 94º to the right, making a 180º clockwiseheading variation. Then, the heading variation was reversed to the counterclockwise direction, completing 5turns in a “flat spin” until the collision with the ground.
The captain (ATPL) had accumulated a total of 5,248 hours and 665 hours on type, the first officer (ATPL) had accumulated a total of 5,143 hours and 3,543 hours on type. The report states: "Both pilots had completed theoretical and practical training and had undergone proficiency exams in a flightsimulator, which included emergency training and, in particular, flight management in icing conditions."
On Sep 6th 2024 CENIPA released their preliminary report summarizing the sequence of events:
Based on the information collected during the initial action, as well as the recordings from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Investigation Commission identified the sequence ofevents that preceded the collision of the aircraft with the ground. To record the times described in this field, Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) was used as a reference.
14:58:05 - the aircraft began takeoff from runway 15 of SBCA, with 58 passengers and 4 crew members onboard;
15:12:40 – PROPELLER ANTI-ICING 1 and 2 were turned on;
15:14:56 - the Electronic Ice Detector connected to the Centralized Crew Alert System (CCAS) displayed awarning signal when crossing FL130;
15:15:03 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;
15:15:42 - a single chime was heard in the cabin. The crew then reported that a Fault message had occurred on the DE-ICING AIRFRAME;
15:15:49 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off;
15:16:25 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
15:17:08 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
15:19:13 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
15:23:43 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
15:30:05 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
16:11:02 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
16:12:41 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal;
16:12:55 - the Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal;
16:15:16 - the Second in Command (SIC) made radio contact with the airline's operational dispatcher at Guarulhos airfield, in order to carry out the necessary coordination for his arrival;
16:16:25 - at the same time as the coordination with the operational dispatcher, a flight attendant wascalled over the intercom. The SIC asked her to wait a moment and continued communication with thedispatcher;
16:17:20 - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped displaying the warning signal. At that moment, the SIC wasrequesting information from the flight attendant in order to transmit it to the operational dispatcher;
16:17:32 - The Electronic Ice Detector displayed a warning signal. At this time, the Pilot in Command (PIC)was informing the passengers about the conditions and the estimated time for landing at SBGR;
16:17:41 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;
16:18:41 - at 191 kt speed, the CRUISE SPEED LOW alert was displayed. Simultaneously, the SIC was finishing passing on some information to the operational dispatch;
16:18:47 - the PIC began the approach briefing for landing at SBGR. Concomitantly, São Paulo Approach Control (APP-SP) made a call and instructed him to change to frequency 123.25 MHz;
16:18:55 - a single chime was heard in the cabin. Simultaneously, communication with APP-SP was taking place;
16:19:07 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off;
16:19:16 - the crew made a call on frequency 123.25 MHz to APP-SP;
16:19:19 - APP-SP requested that PS-VPB maintain FL170 due to traffic;
16:19:23 - the crew responded to APP-SP that they would maintain the flight level and that they were at theideal descent point, a
authorization;16:19:28 - at 184 kt speed, the DEGRADED PERFORMANCE alert was displayed, along with a single chime. The alarm was triggered concomitantly with the message exchanges between APP-SP and the crew;
16:19:30 - APP-SP said they were aware and asked to wait for authorization;
16:19:31 - Passaredo 2283 said he was aware and thanked us;
16:19:33 - the PIC continued to carry out the approach briefing ;
16:20:00 - SIC commented: “a lot of ice”;
16:20:05 - AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on for the third time;
16:20:33 - APP-SP authorized the aircraft to fly directly to the SANPA position, maintaining FL170. Itinformed that the descent would be authorized in two minutes;
16:20:39 - the crew compared the previous message (last communication made by the crew);
16:20:50 - the aircraft began a right turn towards the SANPA position heading;
16:20:57 - during the turn, at 169 kt speed, the INCREASE SPEED alert was displayed, together with a single chime. Immediately afterwards, vibration noises began in the aircraft, together with the activation of the stall alarm ;
16:21:09 - control of the aircraft was lost and it entered an abnormal flight attitude until it collided with theground. At this point, the aircraft tilted 52º to the left and then 94º to the right, making a 180º clockwiseheading variation. Then, the heading variation was reversed to the counterclockwise direction, completing 5turns in a “flat spin” until the collision with the ground.
The captain (ATPL) had accumulated a total of 5,248 hours and 665 hours on type, the first officer (ATPL) had accumulated a total of 5,143 hours and 3,543 hours on type. The report states: "Both pilots had completed theoretical and practical training and had undergone proficiency exams in a flightsimulator, which included emergency training and, in particular, flight management in icing conditions."
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