Mucho se habla del resurgimiento Ruso en la escena belica mundial. Pero la guerra contra Georgia desnudo todas sus miserias. Carencia de equipos de vision nocturna, utilizacion de celulares para coordinacion entre las tropas, grandes descordinaciones a nivel general que costaron muchas vidas. Inclusive tras una evaluacion pos-conflicto los observadores militares de la OTAN concluyeron que a el nivel militar actual, Rusia no superaria a un potencia belica de mediano porte (Italia, España). Parece que el sueño de un mundo bi-polar esta aun muy lejos.
Un articulo de The Economist.
WHEN Russian armoured columns rumbled into Georgia last month, an early casualty was General Anatoly Khrulyov, the head of the 58th Army, who was wounded by shrapnel and evacuated. The Russians lost their most senior commander in the field because, by their own accounts, they did not know where Georgian units were. Russian forces lacked surveillance drones and night-vision equipment. Radios worked poorly, and commanders resorted to using mobile phones. Troops barely co-ordinated with the air force, which lost several jets (among them a Tu-22 strategic bomber) and dropped mostly old “dumb” bombs rather than modern smart ones. The wonder is how the Russians routed the Georgians so swiftly.
The Kremlin had been displaying a new military assertiveness even before its “August war” with Georgia, sending cold-war bombers buzzing close to European and American airspace, holding high-profile naval exercises, announcing ambitious plans to build new aircraft carriers and testing new ballistic missiles. What Vladimir Putin, Russia’s prime minister, has called a “punch in the face” for Georgia may have been an attempt to demonstrate the restoration of Russia’s military power. But it also exposed the poor results from Russia’s recent surge in defence spending.
This has doubled in nominal rouble terms since 2004. Yet much of the extra money has been eaten away by inflation. In any case, Russia’s defence spending is a fraction of America’s (see chart).
Russian commanders have spoken bluntly about shortcomings. President Dmitry Medvedev says that reforming and re-equipping the armed forces will be a top priority. On September 16th, Mr Putin announced a 27% increase in spending next year on “national defence and security”.
Yet much of that money goes on maintaining Russia’s nuclear deterrent. During the cold war it was the West that relied on nuclear weapons to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority; now it is the other way around. Although in better shape than the rest of Russia’s military units, the nuclear forces have not escaped the post-Soviet rot. The first of its new Borey-class nuclear submarines launched last year is useless because its planned intercontinental ballistic missile, the Bulava, designed to outwit anti-missile defences, has been plagued by test failures (Western officials say it has problems with its range too).
Outside experts estimate that one-third of defence spending is embezzled or otherwise mis-spent. Anatoly Serdyukov, the defence minister, has tried to curb corruption among the top brass. Yet Alexander Golts, a Moscow-based defence expert, says “the Russian army is a black hole” into which money simply disappears. The result is a military fantasy in which Russia sends barely functional bombers and warships on long-range missions.
Take the Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft-carrier (once named after the Georgian capital, Tbilisi). It has undergone interminable repairs since being commissioned in 1985. It took part in rare exercises in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean between December 2007 and February this year. In the view of Western experts, the Russians did well simply to avoid its breaking down. Russia’s announcement in July that it will build five or six more aircraft carriers has been met with derision. Russia does not have shipyards able to build such vessels; the Admiral Kuznetsov was built in a shipyard that is now in Ukraine.
That said, Russia makes some good equipment, such as air-defence systems. The infusion of money helps it exercise its atrophied military muscles. A growing proportion of soldiers are volunteers (known as kontraktniki), who are more disciplined than much-abused conscripts. The slow move to a smaller, all-professional army in place of the million-strong, largely conscript force is made more urgent by Russia’s demographic decline.
The forces that invaded Georgia were largely made up of professionals. Despite problems in keeping them supplied, they were for the most part better behaved than the South Ossetian militiamen who looted and destroyed Georgian villages. The Russian army seems to have fought better in Georgia than it did in either of the post-Soviet wars in Chechnya, the now-subdued breakaway province across the border from Georgia. Indeed, the forces sent into Georgia included the Vostok battalion, made up of pro-Kremlin Chechens. Russia’s ability quickly to deploy 20,000-odd soldiers in Georgia (rehearsed in exercises during the summer) showed some skill.
“Russian forces are not modern. Some of their weapons date back to the 1960s and 1970s. But that does not mean they cannot kill you,” says Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian defence writer for Novaya Gazeta, a newspaper. The Russians may not be a match for even a medium-sized Western army, say experts, but they are good enough to scare the poor, post-Soviet states in the “near abroad”.
In the words of a senior American official, “the war in Georgia does not show the Russians have greater military capability, but it demonstrates a greater willingness to use force.” NATO will have to reassess its assumptions about Russia, albeit cautiously to “avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy”, as the official puts it.
The main threats to the West now are Russia’s manipulation of oil and gas exports, its diplomatic spoiling tactics, and its dalliances with Iran, Syria and Venezuela. The danger of a direct attack by Russia is remote. But the indirect threat of its more advanced weapons being sold to such potential Western foes is a growing worry.
Un articulo de The Economist.
WHEN Russian armoured columns rumbled into Georgia last month, an early casualty was General Anatoly Khrulyov, the head of the 58th Army, who was wounded by shrapnel and evacuated. The Russians lost their most senior commander in the field because, by their own accounts, they did not know where Georgian units were. Russian forces lacked surveillance drones and night-vision equipment. Radios worked poorly, and commanders resorted to using mobile phones. Troops barely co-ordinated with the air force, which lost several jets (among them a Tu-22 strategic bomber) and dropped mostly old “dumb” bombs rather than modern smart ones. The wonder is how the Russians routed the Georgians so swiftly.
The Kremlin had been displaying a new military assertiveness even before its “August war” with Georgia, sending cold-war bombers buzzing close to European and American airspace, holding high-profile naval exercises, announcing ambitious plans to build new aircraft carriers and testing new ballistic missiles. What Vladimir Putin, Russia’s prime minister, has called a “punch in the face” for Georgia may have been an attempt to demonstrate the restoration of Russia’s military power. But it also exposed the poor results from Russia’s recent surge in defence spending.
This has doubled in nominal rouble terms since 2004. Yet much of the extra money has been eaten away by inflation. In any case, Russia’s defence spending is a fraction of America’s (see chart).
Russian commanders have spoken bluntly about shortcomings. President Dmitry Medvedev says that reforming and re-equipping the armed forces will be a top priority. On September 16th, Mr Putin announced a 27% increase in spending next year on “national defence and security”.
Yet much of that money goes on maintaining Russia’s nuclear deterrent. During the cold war it was the West that relied on nuclear weapons to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority; now it is the other way around. Although in better shape than the rest of Russia’s military units, the nuclear forces have not escaped the post-Soviet rot. The first of its new Borey-class nuclear submarines launched last year is useless because its planned intercontinental ballistic missile, the Bulava, designed to outwit anti-missile defences, has been plagued by test failures (Western officials say it has problems with its range too).
Outside experts estimate that one-third of defence spending is embezzled or otherwise mis-spent. Anatoly Serdyukov, the defence minister, has tried to curb corruption among the top brass. Yet Alexander Golts, a Moscow-based defence expert, says “the Russian army is a black hole” into which money simply disappears. The result is a military fantasy in which Russia sends barely functional bombers and warships on long-range missions.
Take the Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft-carrier (once named after the Georgian capital, Tbilisi). It has undergone interminable repairs since being commissioned in 1985. It took part in rare exercises in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean between December 2007 and February this year. In the view of Western experts, the Russians did well simply to avoid its breaking down. Russia’s announcement in July that it will build five or six more aircraft carriers has been met with derision. Russia does not have shipyards able to build such vessels; the Admiral Kuznetsov was built in a shipyard that is now in Ukraine.
That said, Russia makes some good equipment, such as air-defence systems. The infusion of money helps it exercise its atrophied military muscles. A growing proportion of soldiers are volunteers (known as kontraktniki), who are more disciplined than much-abused conscripts. The slow move to a smaller, all-professional army in place of the million-strong, largely conscript force is made more urgent by Russia’s demographic decline.
The forces that invaded Georgia were largely made up of professionals. Despite problems in keeping them supplied, they were for the most part better behaved than the South Ossetian militiamen who looted and destroyed Georgian villages. The Russian army seems to have fought better in Georgia than it did in either of the post-Soviet wars in Chechnya, the now-subdued breakaway province across the border from Georgia. Indeed, the forces sent into Georgia included the Vostok battalion, made up of pro-Kremlin Chechens. Russia’s ability quickly to deploy 20,000-odd soldiers in Georgia (rehearsed in exercises during the summer) showed some skill.
“Russian forces are not modern. Some of their weapons date back to the 1960s and 1970s. But that does not mean they cannot kill you,” says Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian defence writer for Novaya Gazeta, a newspaper. The Russians may not be a match for even a medium-sized Western army, say experts, but they are good enough to scare the poor, post-Soviet states in the “near abroad”.
In the words of a senior American official, “the war in Georgia does not show the Russians have greater military capability, but it demonstrates a greater willingness to use force.” NATO will have to reassess its assumptions about Russia, albeit cautiously to “avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy”, as the official puts it.
The main threats to the West now are Russia’s manipulation of oil and gas exports, its diplomatic spoiling tactics, and its dalliances with Iran, Syria and Venezuela. The danger of a direct attack by Russia is remote. But the indirect threat of its more advanced weapons being sold to such potential Western foes is a growing worry.
or su parte, The Economist (“Explaining the price of oil”) niega que la subida desbocada del precio del petróleo se deba a una burbuja financiera, insistiendo en que los precios de las materias primas son independientes de los precios de los productos financieros derivados. Sea como sea, todo el mundo exige transparencia y regulación en los mercados de derivados.fuente y fecha: Miércoles, 24 Sep 08 ;
