Noticias de Siria
- Tema iniciado Barbanegra
- Fecha de inicio
SERA VERDAD??
Oficiales turcos vivos en manos de las fuerzas armadas del ejército árabe sirio De modo que dos oficiales turcos fueron arrestados con varios terroristas (15), y los oficiales turcos estaban trabajando como líderes de grupos terroristas armados en el Gran Urum (Kubra)
Oficiales turcos vivos en manos de las fuerzas armadas del ejército árabe sirio De modo que dos oficiales turcos fueron arrestados con varios terroristas (15), y los oficiales turcos estaban trabajando como líderes de grupos terroristas armados en el Gran Urum (Kubra)
lo habia puesto liveuamap, totalmente pro-terrorista con el icono azul de negacion de paso ,ya no esta mas ese icono en el mapa de la pagina....La televisión rusa reporta que los soldados de los puestos turcos en Alepo impiden el paso por la carretera M-5 a los soldados sirios. En cambio, dejan pasar a los rusos
Interesante texto de Tom Cooper sobre el estado y capacidades de la Fuerza Aérea Siria
A few words on the ‘Syrian Arab Air Force‘ (or, actually: whatever was left of the same).
(Mind: the following is especially for all those ‘sympathising’ with it, crying crocodile tears about its losses, or feeling ‘sad’ because they think that it’s ‘fighting Jihadists’ and the ‘ISIS’ and whatever else.)
1.) The SyAAF was NOT created by Hafez al-Assad, as usually explained around. It was created already in 1946-1948 period. Assad joined the Military Academy in Homs in 1950, and the SyAAF only in 1954, when the Flight College was established at Nayrab AB.
2.) Assad did fly Meteors and then MiG-17PFs, in 1956-1961 period, but was no ‘special’, not even ‘distinguished’ pilot. Actually, even while serving as the CO of the No. 31 Squadron UARAF, in period 1960-1961, he spent more time with plotting a coup against Nasser’s rule over Egypt and Syria (back then united as the United Arab Republic), than with actually flying, training, or at least commanding his unit.
3.) The ‘most’ Hafez al-Assad ever did for the SyAAF was to convert the SyAAF Intelligence Agency into his private secret service and a militia, back in 1965-1967 period. Eventually, that intelligence service became the most powerful and most brutally obsessive in all of Syria: it was solely responsible for securing Assad’s regime, and not the least ever interested in such topics like ‘Israel’ or whatever else. The SyAAF Intelligence Agency was crucial for enabling Assad to establish himself in power.
4.) Since the October 1973 War with Israel, the SyAAF was systematically purged of the Sunnis, although these (including Sunni Kurds) are making over 80% of the Syrian population. They were replaced by whoever was proven as loyal to Assad: nothing else, no merits, no distinguished service, no heroism matters.
5.) The Syrian Arab Air Force is effectively dead since February 1982. Back then, a major plot for a coup against Hafez al-Assad was prevented by the SyAAF Intelligence Agency. The air force was subsequently purged ‘to the bone’. Ever since, it’s officers are officially prohibited from discussing even causes for accidents, not to talk about tactics: anybody heard trying to talk about either is promptly jailed.
6.) Ever since 1988-1989, for all of the 1990s and 2000s, flying was cut to the bare minimum. Squadron COs would fly 40 hours a year (if there were fuel and spares). Deputy Squadron-COs usually flew 20-25 hours: they also served as ‘instructors’ for all other pilots in every unit. Everybody else flew next to nothing.
7.) There was no tactical training (not even theory), and pilot wages decreased to a level where most of officers worked in the air force in the morning, and then as taxi drivers or tourist guides in the afternoon.
8.) When the SyAAF was ordered into combat, in 2011, pilots had to teach themselves how to fly and release bombs (usually with help of 30-years-old-manuals) – as far as they have cared to do so.
9.) Since May 2012, the mass of orders for air strikes is issued by the Ba’ath Party HQ in Damascus (i.e. not even by the High Command SyAAF). Every order contains such details like target, ammunition to use, and what pilots are to fly the mission. Pilots have to sign the receipt of the order.
10.) Because the mass of pilots can barely fly and release their weapons, only a handful could actually ‘aim’ – and most of these were instructor pilots flying L-39s (simply because they were receiving more flight hours, due to their duty to train student pilots). Thus, most the times the ‘target’ is the ‘town’ or the ‘village’, sometimes a ‘farm’, and very seldom ‘specific building’.
11.) About a dozen of pilots that refused such orders have been ‘disappeared’. About 20 others were arrested and bestially tortured before returning to service. Those that were lucky to bring their families to safety on time, have defected. Indeed, in 2012-2013, the SyAAF (and the SyAAF Intelligence Agency) lost more than 50% of its personnel to defections.
12.) Regardless of their rank and merits, homes of defectors were either torched down or – if outside the reach of the regime on the ground – bombed by the SyAAF.
13.) Those left are de-facto ‘hostages’. The Assad regime explained them that they have to (quote) ‘burn the Sunnis’, and that the survival of Assad is their own survival, too.
14.) Every evening, all of them have to gather in the squadron ready room, must watch news at the national TV and cheer about (quote) ‘burning Sunnis’. The more they cheer, the more loyal they’re considered to Assad. Some of them were more than happy to brag about their ‘achievements’ in the social media, too (for example after the attack on the UN and the Syrian Red Crescent’s aid convoy in Urum al-Kubra, in September 2016).
15.) The SyAAF is very rarely fighting the ‘IS’ (aka ISIS/ISIL/IGIL or whatever else you want to call that gang: locally it’s named the Daesh). Out of well over 100,000 combat sorties flown by the SyAAF since 2011, perhaps 500 were undertaken against the Daesh. The reason is that with a handful of exceptions (see Tabqa and Kweres), the Assad regime never seriously fought the Daesh (and if it did, the SyAAF couldn’t provide close air support).
Bottom line: that ‘SyAAF’ is no ‘air force’, no service ‘consisting of gentleman warriors’, as is usually thought about air forces. At most, it’s a ‘flying militia’: a gang of armed people that happen to know how to fly their aircraft and helicopters, and whose primary task is to either destroy or drive out any ‘anti-Assad elements’.
Their ‘success’ should be well-known to everybody meanwhile (and if it is not, then I recommend the reader of this line an urgent check of his/her ‘knowledge’ about the Syrian Civil War): out of an estimated population of 24 million, 13.5 million have been registered as displaced persons by the UN.
The majority of the Syrians (about 60%) that are nowadays homeless refugees – regardless if abroad or at home – say they have fled from air strikes.
A few words on the ‘Syrian Arab Air Force‘ (or, actually: whatever was left of the same).
(Mind: the following is especially for all those ‘sympathising’ with it, crying crocodile tears about its losses, or feeling ‘sad’ because they think that it’s ‘fighting Jihadists’ and the ‘ISIS’ and whatever else.)
1.) The SyAAF was NOT created by Hafez al-Assad, as usually explained around. It was created already in 1946-1948 period. Assad joined the Military Academy in Homs in 1950, and the SyAAF only in 1954, when the Flight College was established at Nayrab AB.
2.) Assad did fly Meteors and then MiG-17PFs, in 1956-1961 period, but was no ‘special’, not even ‘distinguished’ pilot. Actually, even while serving as the CO of the No. 31 Squadron UARAF, in period 1960-1961, he spent more time with plotting a coup against Nasser’s rule over Egypt and Syria (back then united as the United Arab Republic), than with actually flying, training, or at least commanding his unit.
3.) The ‘most’ Hafez al-Assad ever did for the SyAAF was to convert the SyAAF Intelligence Agency into his private secret service and a militia, back in 1965-1967 period. Eventually, that intelligence service became the most powerful and most brutally obsessive in all of Syria: it was solely responsible for securing Assad’s regime, and not the least ever interested in such topics like ‘Israel’ or whatever else. The SyAAF Intelligence Agency was crucial for enabling Assad to establish himself in power.
4.) Since the October 1973 War with Israel, the SyAAF was systematically purged of the Sunnis, although these (including Sunni Kurds) are making over 80% of the Syrian population. They were replaced by whoever was proven as loyal to Assad: nothing else, no merits, no distinguished service, no heroism matters.
5.) The Syrian Arab Air Force is effectively dead since February 1982. Back then, a major plot for a coup against Hafez al-Assad was prevented by the SyAAF Intelligence Agency. The air force was subsequently purged ‘to the bone’. Ever since, it’s officers are officially prohibited from discussing even causes for accidents, not to talk about tactics: anybody heard trying to talk about either is promptly jailed.
6.) Ever since 1988-1989, for all of the 1990s and 2000s, flying was cut to the bare minimum. Squadron COs would fly 40 hours a year (if there were fuel and spares). Deputy Squadron-COs usually flew 20-25 hours: they also served as ‘instructors’ for all other pilots in every unit. Everybody else flew next to nothing.
7.) There was no tactical training (not even theory), and pilot wages decreased to a level where most of officers worked in the air force in the morning, and then as taxi drivers or tourist guides in the afternoon.
8.) When the SyAAF was ordered into combat, in 2011, pilots had to teach themselves how to fly and release bombs (usually with help of 30-years-old-manuals) – as far as they have cared to do so.
9.) Since May 2012, the mass of orders for air strikes is issued by the Ba’ath Party HQ in Damascus (i.e. not even by the High Command SyAAF). Every order contains such details like target, ammunition to use, and what pilots are to fly the mission. Pilots have to sign the receipt of the order.
10.) Because the mass of pilots can barely fly and release their weapons, only a handful could actually ‘aim’ – and most of these were instructor pilots flying L-39s (simply because they were receiving more flight hours, due to their duty to train student pilots). Thus, most the times the ‘target’ is the ‘town’ or the ‘village’, sometimes a ‘farm’, and very seldom ‘specific building’.
11.) About a dozen of pilots that refused such orders have been ‘disappeared’. About 20 others were arrested and bestially tortured before returning to service. Those that were lucky to bring their families to safety on time, have defected. Indeed, in 2012-2013, the SyAAF (and the SyAAF Intelligence Agency) lost more than 50% of its personnel to defections.
12.) Regardless of their rank and merits, homes of defectors were either torched down or – if outside the reach of the regime on the ground – bombed by the SyAAF.
13.) Those left are de-facto ‘hostages’. The Assad regime explained them that they have to (quote) ‘burn the Sunnis’, and that the survival of Assad is their own survival, too.
14.) Every evening, all of them have to gather in the squadron ready room, must watch news at the national TV and cheer about (quote) ‘burning Sunnis’. The more they cheer, the more loyal they’re considered to Assad. Some of them were more than happy to brag about their ‘achievements’ in the social media, too (for example after the attack on the UN and the Syrian Red Crescent’s aid convoy in Urum al-Kubra, in September 2016).
15.) The SyAAF is very rarely fighting the ‘IS’ (aka ISIS/ISIL/IGIL or whatever else you want to call that gang: locally it’s named the Daesh). Out of well over 100,000 combat sorties flown by the SyAAF since 2011, perhaps 500 were undertaken against the Daesh. The reason is that with a handful of exceptions (see Tabqa and Kweres), the Assad regime never seriously fought the Daesh (and if it did, the SyAAF couldn’t provide close air support).
Bottom line: that ‘SyAAF’ is no ‘air force’, no service ‘consisting of gentleman warriors’, as is usually thought about air forces. At most, it’s a ‘flying militia’: a gang of armed people that happen to know how to fly their aircraft and helicopters, and whose primary task is to either destroy or drive out any ‘anti-Assad elements’.
Their ‘success’ should be well-known to everybody meanwhile (and if it is not, then I recommend the reader of this line an urgent check of his/her ‘knowledge’ about the Syrian Civil War): out of an estimated population of 24 million, 13.5 million have been registered as displaced persons by the UN.
The majority of the Syrians (about 60%) that are nowadays homeless refugees – regardless if abroad or at home – say they have fled from air strikes.
Tremendo texto. Incluye un hecho no muy conocido: los servicios de inteligencia de la Fuerza aérea eran los màs temidos. No incluye, o se me ha pasado. que las "Fuerzas Tigre" fueron creadas por esos servicios, hasta agosto pasado, en que el Ejército presionó para que se integrase en sus filas con el nombre de División 25 de Misiones de Fuerzas Especiales.
Un saludo
Ehhhhh.... 10.000?? Si vamos a exagerar y tirar cifras así como así, digamos directamente 1.000.000 , no?
No deben haber más de 1000 tropas turcas en todo el Este de Siria, tal vez un poco más ahora. Pero ni a palos llega a 10.000!!! Esos puestos de observación turcos que mencionás apenas si tienen un par de soldados cada uno y todos esos convoys que se ven generalmente vienen compuestos en su mayoría de camiones de carga que entran y salen.
Para que te des una idea de los números de los que estamos hablando: los rusos que tienen una bruta base naval y otra aérea, además de barcos, aviones, sistemas de defensa aérea, artillería, comandos, miembros de policía militar, vehículos de todo tipo, asesores, y todo la parafernalia desparramada por toda Siria apenas tienen entre 2000 y 2500 personas ahí... lo que no es poco!! abrazo
Posiblemente esté totalmente equivocado. Mus fundamentos son videos de tuoteros y corresponsales que siempre son subjetivos (para un lado o para otro).
Pero así como a vos te parece una locura hablar de 10k, a mi me parece una locura hablar de 1k
.Y tanto en caso de los turcos como en el caso de los rusos, una cosa es lo que dicen, y otra es lo que hacen. Ni a gancho me como el cuento que entre tartus, Hemeimim y en las operaciones terrestres tienen 2.5k de soldados los rusos.
Saludos
Eso explica muchas cosas... Amen de que quien lo escribe debe tener sus intenciones, tira muchos datos constatables fácilmente para quien sigue la guerra.
Saludos
El Ejército sirio despliega el lanzacohetes termobàrico TOS-1A en la provincia de Alepo
Fuentes pro-gubernamentales han publicado una foto que muestra el lanzacohetes pesado que es trasladado por una carretera cerca del centro de la ciudad de Alepo.
El TOS-1A, que está instalado sobre el chasis del tanque T-72, lanza cohetes pesados de 220 milímetros con un alcance de hasta 6 kilómetros. Esos cohetes están dotados de una ojiva de explosivos termobàricos, es decir explosivos aéreos de combustible pesado.
El lanzacohetes termobárico se utiliza sobre todo contra soldados, equipos y edificios, incluidas fortificaciones trincheras, túneles y cuevas.
El Ejèrcito sirio opera un número no precisado de estos lanzamisiles termobáricos, suministrados por Rusia desde 2015.
Última edición:
El Ejército sirio toma el control de varios barrios en las afueras de la ciudad de Alepo
Los barrios de los que el Ejèrcito ha tomado hoy el control son el de Rashideen 1, el Complejo de viviendas Al-Kahraba, el Complejo de Viviendas Al-Sham, el Centro de Investigaciones Científicas y la Academia de Policía.
Según fuentes pro-gubernamentales, las tropas avanzan ahora en los barrios de Al-Rashideen 1 y 2, entre duros combates con Hay'at Tahrir as-Sham y grupos pro-turcos.
Anteriormente, el Ejército liberó la localidad de Kafranah, al Oeste de la capital.
Las unidades del Ejército también han reanudado su avance en el Este de Idlib y han capturado Ma'aret Elnassan.
"Abu TOW",conocido por sus ataques con lanzamisiles realiza hoy su disparo número 133 contra el Ejército sirio en Nahbul Zahraa, del frente de Alepo Occidental
Interensante nota.
Un poco tendenciosa.
Y hace alguna afirmaciones bastante equivocadas.
Por ejemplo que "el regimen de Assad nunca lucho seriamente contra Isis"
igualmente me parece interesante
Los avances de hoy del SAA, se empieza a hacer complicada la situación de los rebelde al norte de Alepo.
La nueva linea de puntos de control desplegada por los turcos parece asumir de hecho que el norte de Alepo va a caer. Y seguramente ahí finalice la ofensiva.
Tal vez ese sea el nuevo acuerdo Putin-Erdogan.
La nueva linea de puntos de control desplegada por los turcos parece asumir de hecho que el norte de Alepo va a caer. Y seguramente ahí finalice la ofensiva.
Tal vez ese sea el nuevo acuerdo Putin-Erdogan.
Última edición:
"Elementos radicales sirios"
A quien se refiere?
Los juegos, alqaeda, el SAA...
Que mensaje ambiguo.
Será para que los jihadistas se encuadren?
No lo habían matado a ese flaco ya?
"Abu TOW",conocido por sus ataques con lanzamisiles realiza hoy su disparo número 133 contra el Ejército sirio en Nahbul Zahraa, del frente de Alepo Occidental
Ni que yo fuera Erdogan. Preguntaselo a él. Si es por teléfono, habrá que contratar a un interprete de turco. Te lo adelantó, estoy casi seguro que los kurdos van los primeros en la lista.
Hay un claro derrumbe en el frente rebelde alrededor de Alepo, es cosa de tiempo para que el SAA embolse el sector rebelde al noroeste de Alepo.
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