pasa que en un parrafo de no mas de 5 lineas, el sr. Farlaine joya joya nunca taxi, expresa que le hicieron aplaudir para ver si estaba conciente
Perdoname marce, pero VOS leiste anoche y a las apuradas las 5 lineas que yo te mostre, pero yo llevo leidas mas de 400 paginas donde Fairlane viene contando como se sucedieron las cosas...
, formaron una linea e hicieron un listado del personal del coventry...en la lista estaban 74 nombres de los 290... nada mas...incluso, en esas lineas, tampoco dice si estaba en el broadsword
Marce: te falta data, no lo dice en esas lineas porque desde 15 paginas antes que viene contando como fueron las cosas...
, fort austin o el uganda...ni siquiera determina en que momento hizo el conteo
Otra vez, vos leiste 15 renglones anoche antes del programa, no es suficiente para sustentar lo que estas diciendo, el hombre SI dice donde esta, cuenta como llego alli, que se encontro al llegar, como organiza el recuento y cuales son los resultados... insisto, te olvidas de todo el resto...
si existio una evacuacion previa, si todos los que conto incluso eran los de las dos balsas salvavidas o si pudo contar los que se traslado directamente heliportado (sin tocar el broadsword) hasta el fort austin o el uganda.
Marcelo: el tipo no habla de nada de esto que decis, de donde lo sacaste? en el libro que te mostre ayer, en lo que has tenido oportunidad de leer, ni menciona los buques que vos indicas, seguro que te estas confundiendo con informacion de otro lado... el hombre dice justamente que TODOS FUERON EN UN PRINCIPIO A LA BROADSWORD... sin excepcion...
en otras palabras...lo que dice el sr farlaine, es solo una parte de la historia total
Tano, me estas haciendo calentar al final, en otras palabras nada, quien sos vos para "interpretarlo" al tipo, decime de donde sacas la informacion para manuipular lo que el marino deja ESCRITO, que ademas debe haber sido verificado por el que firma el libro que ademas debe haber sido supervisado por el IWM, o ya te olvidaste de lo que te hice leer en la pagina Nº 1???
de un momento dado en una circunstancia dada, sobre lo que ocurrio en el coventry. pero te digo...siempre estoy abierto (en el buen sentido) a nuevas teorias o pruebas...
Pienso que faltas a la verdad, vos no estas abierto a otra cosa que no sea lo que lees en internet y logras interpretar, decis un momento y circunstancias dada... que pensas que te cuenta como paso su cumpleaños el tipo??? no te conocia en esta fas... tidiosa actitud de negar por negar... en fin, debes estar en uno de "esos dias", te perdono:cheers2:
los ingleses (como el sr farlaine coupe) tambien dicen esto ...
http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/25thmay1982.php
yo no veo alli "declaraciones" de este tipo...
incluso manifiestan que al momento del ataque, el gobierno ingles dijo que se habia atacado una tipo 42 sin precisar cual poniendo en vilo a todas las familias de los embarcados en dicho buque.
es un dato mas el que tira el libro, pero en si, no esclarece nada, sino que las palabras del mismo pueden generar mas incertidumbre que certeza.
No te perdono un carajo!!! (jajajaaj) decime una cosa: ahora resulta ser que no te alcanza con "interpretar" lo ininterpretable sino que ademas, lo descalificas, seguramente vos no has estado alli como para darte semejante gusto.. que estas orinando alejado del recipiento no tengo dudas, decime que te mueve a hacerlo asi aprendo algo mas de los mucho que me has hecho aprender en estos años, dale: que es lo que no te cierra?
pd: yo creo, que donde mas tenemos que poner el ojo, es en el dia 8...si existe alguna probabilidad de diferencia entre caidos reales y no reconocidos...es ahi.
Si, eso, mira para otro lado... hasta que sepas lo que paso, no te guste y mires para otroa lado y asi... dejate de joder tano!
pd2: respecto al sargento armero de la antelope, que fue declarado muerto...es correcto!!...aun cuando el cuerpo jamas se recupero y se encuentra desaparecido
y... si.... yo creo que si... Gardel tambien esta muerto, no sabias?
Nico, que queres que te diga...TOMALO ENTRE PINZAS!!...los radaristas (tanto enrique, o VYCA), no dicen esto...incluso en el diario de operaciones aereas de no me acuerdo quien (ayuda norbert!! el alzheimer me esta matando!!), sobre el dia 30...no refleja nada en especial ni diferencias al respecto.
Silva esta tan de acuerdo con esto y opuesto a la version oficial de la FAA que no habla en publico de este asunto, yo tengo un correo que ha tenido la amabilidad de cursarme ante mi invitacion a MM que aclara este punto, y no solo es muy respetable y atendible la actitud, sino que sigo valorando muchisimo lo expuesto por él ya que es quien ha generado la informacion despues de todo.
Me parece que hay cosas que se repiten hasta el cansancio desdibujando la informacion, al final resulta que hay tanta gente que dice lo mismo que tendemos a creer que es la verrdad, cuando puede estar pasando que se repite lo que no se vio y se lo esta haciendo propio despues de tantos años.
supuestamente el radar de malvinas...pero te aclaro algo...el Brigadier conto el ataque al invincible, en forma SEMEJANTE a lo declarado por Moro...osea...
te mando un abrazo
Si, es asi y fue evidente para los que seguimos esto pero como hemos dicho recientemente por otras razones, ess cosas se instalan colectivamente y luego no las sacas con nada, pese a que faltan a la verdad o al menos, no tienen la justeza que debiera tener esta parte de la historia.
Un abrazote Tano, te espero...
Norberto
:grouphug:
---------- Post added at 11:34 ---------- Previous post was at 11:25 ----------
no Gabi, no pasa por culpas, pasa que en un parrafo de no mas de 5 lineas, el sr. Farlaine joya joya nunca taxi, expresa que le hicieron aplaudir para ver si estaba conciente, formaron una linea e hicieron un listado del personal del coventry...en la lista estaban 74 nombres de los 290... nada mas...incluso, en esas lineas, tampoco dice si estaba en el broadsword, fort austin o el uganda...ni siquiera determina en que momento hizo el conteo, si existio una evacuacion previa, si todos los que conto incluso eran los de las dos balsas salvavidas o si pudo contar los que se traslado directamente heliportado (sin tocar el broadsword) hasta el fort austin o el uganda.
en otras palabras...lo que dice el sr farlaine, es solo una parte de la historia total, de un momento dado en una circunstancia dada, sobre lo que ocurrio en el coventry. pero te digo...siempre estoy abierto (en el buen sentido) a nuevas teorias o pruebas...
los ingleses (como el sr farlaine coupe) tambien dicen esto ...
http://www.hmscoventry.co.uk/25thmay1982.php
incluso manifiestan que al momento del ataque, el gobierno ingles dijo que se habia atacado una tipo 42 sin precisar cual poniendo en vilo a todas las familias de los embarcados en dicho buque.
es un dato mas el que tira el libro, pero en si, no esclarece nada, sino que las palabras del mismo pueden generar mas incertidumbre que certeza.
un gran abrazo
pd: yo creo, que donde mas tenemos que poner el ojo, es en el dia 8...si existe alguna probabilidad de diferencia entre caidos reales y no reconocidos...es ahi.
pd2: respecto al sargento armero de la antelope, que fue declarado muerto...es correcto!!...aun cuando el cuerpo jamas se recupero y se encuentra desaparecido ..
---------- Post added at 09:41 ---------- Previous post was at 09:37 ----------
Nico, que queres que te diga...TOMALO ENTRE PINZAS!!...los radaristas (tanto enrique, o VYCA), no dicen esto...incluso en el diario de operaciones aereas de no me acuerdo quien (ayuda norbert!! el alzheimer me esta matando!!), sobre el dia 30...no refleja nada en especial ni diferencias al respecto.
supuestamente el radar de malvinas...pero te aclaro algo...el Brigadier conto el ataque al invincible, en forma SEMEJANTE a lo declarado por Moro...osea...
te mando un abrazo
che Marce: dejate de joder, aca dice que fueron a esos buques el dia siguiente.... te pareces al Ingeniero al final:rofl:
26th May:
Coventry's survivors were spread among the Broadsword, RFA Fort Austin and the hospital ship Uganda. Some of the more serious casualties had been airlifted to the field hospital at Ajax Bay. Later the survivors were consolidated and transported via helicopter or landing craft to Fort Austin and thence to safer waters East of the Malvinas. After that they were transferred by boat to the RFA Stromness.
27th May:
Stromness sailed for South Georgia. The injured had been airlifted onto the hospital ship Uganda.
Marce: que feo...
:yonofui:
Aca tampoco veo como te dije las declaraciones de Failane 500 techo vinilico a las que vos aludis para descalificarlo....
On 25th May 1982 - Argentina's National Day - Fuerza Area Argentina (Argentine Air Force) A-4B Skyhawks from Grupo 5 had been given a mission specifically targeted at Coventry and Broadsword. The two ships had been on picket duty, North-West of the Malvinas Islands, acting as both early warning and the first layer of defences. They had become quite a thorn in the side for the Argentine forces as a result. Two raids were scheduled against the ships.
The first raid descended into chaos and was abandoned when Coventry shot down one of the aircraft with a Sea Dart. The second raid, unfortunately, had more luck.
Split into two flights of three ('Vulcano' and 'Zeus' flights), Vulcan flight took off missing one aircraft which had become unserviceable. Zeus flight also became short one aircraft shortly after departure. The remaining four Skyhawks flew on. As Coventry and Broadsword were closer to the Argentine mainland than the remainder of the task force, a full load of three 1,000lb bombs could be carried by each aircraft.
Flying extremely low and initially hiding behind Isla de Borbón (Pebble Island) to the South, Coventry's radar was unable to pick up any of the incoming aircraft. Broadsword, however, could see two targets, and called off a Sea Harrier CAP, confident that they could deal with the raid. Coventry's radar was still unable to break out the contacts from the ground return of Isla de Borbón (Pebble Island), and her lookouts spotted the aircraft first. Small arms and Oerlikon fire opened up, and the two A-4s altered course away from Coventry and towards Broadsword, which had a firm Sea Wolf lock on a single contact.
Just before the Sea Wolf was ready to fire, however, the single target it had locked became two, confusing the system. The launcher slewed to its stowed fore/aft position, and was unable to be reset in time before these first two A-4s attacked the Broadsword.
Vulcano flight - Capitán P. Marcos Carballo and Teniente Carlos Rinke - both attacked the Broadsword, but of their six bombs, only one managed to hit the Broadsword in the face of intense fire, including small arms. This bomb bounced off the sea near the stern, passed through the side of the ship and up through the flight deck, tearing the nose off the Lynx helicopter in the process and starting a fire. The bomb continued up and away from the ship, landing harmlessly in the sea nearby.
Zeus flight - Primer Teniente Mariano A. Velasco and Alférez Leonardo Barrionuevo - soon followed on. Once again Coventry and Broadsword declined assistance from the Sea Harrier CAP. Coventry fired a single Sea Dart but both A-4s managed to evade the missile. Broadsword's Sea Wolf locked on, but in carrying out last-minute evasive manouevres, Coventry crossed in front of the Broadsword's line of fire, and her Sea Wolf was unable to fire for fear of hitting the Coventry instead. The two A-4s were now only seconds away.
Velasco fired his cannons, hitting the hangar area, and then pressed his bomb release but all three of his bombs failed to drop away from the aircraft. Unfortunately that was the very last of Coventry's luck. Barrionuevo released his bombs at just the right moment and all three hit the ship, carving a path of destruction deep into the interior of the ship. Fitted with delay fuses, one bomb failed to go off, but the other two exploded deep within the ship several seconds later, tearing out a large amount of her port side and killing several of the crew, mostly in the auxiliary machine space, computer room and dining room where the first aid party were stationed. The explosion just forward of the computer room boiled up through the open computer room hatch and wrecked the operations room. A large fire immediately took hold and water began pouring into the ship through the holes ripped in her side.
The third bomb had not gone off, but the hole it ripped through the decks allowed smoke and fire to spread beyond the abilities of damage control to combat it, and as ever more water poured into the ship she began rapidly listing to port. The large number of holes torn by the bombs, explosions and cannon fire became submerged and added to the weight of water pouring into the ship.
No ship-wide order to abandon ship was given - the confusion and chaos and total failure of ship-wide communications saw to that, but it was clear to everybody that Coventry was in a bad way and had to be abandoned. Quietly, efficiently, the crew nearest the upper decks had released the starboard side life rafts - those on the port side were at too sharp an angle to be of any use now. Evacuation took place in an orderly fashion, while several members of crew were performing heroics rescuing fellow survivors from shattered and burning compartments throughout the ship.
Broadsword had immediately begun rescue operations using her ship's boats and helicopters also arrived from the ships in San Carlos Water. A particularly brave bit of flying from CPO Aircrewman M J Tupper of 846 NAS - hovering very near to the Coventry's magazine (which could have blown up at any moment) - resulted in 17 survivors in life rafts trapped alongside the ship being lifted onto the Broadsword. Tupper later received the Distinguished Service Medal for his bravery. Broadsword's crew performed just as magnificently, with her ship's boat and Gemini towing life rafts away from the Coventry as she rolled over despite the ever present danger of a major explosion.
Twenty minutes after the first bomb had hit the ship, Coventry had capsized completely. 19 of her crew were dead.
The Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, caused a great deal of suffering back home that evening by announcing that a Type 42 had been hit and was 'in difficulty'. With four surviving Type 42s down south, that meant more than a thousand families were worrying about their loved ones. Portsmouth was a tense and quiet city that evening. It wasn't until around lunchtime the next day that next of kin were finally informed, and many were incorrectly told that their loved ones were missing. The media confirmed that the ship involved was the Coventry, in many cases before the Ministry of Defence had got in touch with the next of kin of the crew. Many of the 'missing' men were confirmed to be on the survivors list only after one more day of heartache for the families.
All four Skyhawks returned to base safely, though Carballo's A-4 had one fuel tank holed by fire from the Broadsword. The unlucky pilot of the aircraft whose bombs failed to drop - Velasco - was back in action two days later, carrying out an attack on the troops in Ajax Bay. HMS Fearless raked his A-4 with cannon fire and his aircraft burst into flame. With hydraulics also lost, Velasco ejected over West Malvinas between Port Fox and Puerto Mitre (Port Howard). After 2 days walking he found an empty house which contained some food, and shortly afterwards met some kelpers. After unsuccessfully trying to buy a horse from them, he was dropped off at Puerto Mitre (Port Howard). He took no further part in the war. The other three pilots on the raid also survived the rest of the conflict.
yo no se mucho ingles, pero me parece que este articulo que vos utilizaste como sustento de lo que argumentas, pero ni una palabra del protagonista... no te habras equivocado de direccion web?
Verba volant scripta manent
