Ni nona vivio 50 años en argentina y hablaba gallego todo el tiempo ("culitiño de hurmiga" me decia).
el tipo es legislador por su barrio...conoce su barrio, conoce lo que necesita y va a reclamar por el...es legislador...no un diputado.
Conociendo a los usurpadores
- Tema iniciado Cocker
- Fecha de inicio
el tipo es legislador por su barrio...conoce su barrio, conoce lo que necesita y va a reclamar por el...es legislador...no un diputado.
Buscando otro tema, me encontré con esto...
http://www.ukipdaily.com/preventing-second-Malvinas-war-nov-2016-edition/
http://www.ukipdaily.com/preventing-second-Malvinas-war-nov-2016-edition/
Como siempre hago, probé el LINK y no funciona...asi que les copio el artículo...
Home » debate » Preventing the Second Malvinas War (Nov 2016 edition)
Preventing the Second Malvinas War (Nov 2016 edition)
Posted on December 6, 2016 by Aidan Powlesland in debate // 8 Comments
[Ed: This is the first part of a two part article; part two will be published later this week.]
The exclusive British maritime economic zone of the 778 Malvinas islands contains an estimated 30 billion barrels of oil reserves worth (assuming 20% wastage and $50 per barrel), £520 billion pounds after extraction costs of £680 billion pounds so £1200 billion gross.
The UK should take steps now to ensure that Argentina (or, say, Russia), £520 billion potential profit notwithstanding, knows that invading the Malvinas will not pay in the late 2010s or 2020s.
I estimate the United Kingdom spent £340 million (£110 million on naval defence, £110 million on air defence, £26 million on army defence and £94 million on support) defending the Malvinas in 2014. It almost might as well have spent nothing.
The last line of defence of the Malvinas are the 120 soldiers of the British army infantry company group there (the other circa 1,080 military servicemen and women, although the 140 Royal Engineers might disagree with me, are largely non-combat personnel).
260 combat personnel may be sufficient to act as a trip wire but a trip wire did not prevent war in 1982.
In the spring of 2015 Michael Fallon announced a £180 million upgrade to the islands’ forces focused on improved command, control and communications facilities. A better use of less money would have been the approximately £90 million annual expenditure required to beef up the infantry company group already there to battle group strength of circa 1,000 infantry and artillerymen. Such a force would be disproportionately potent as it would include, which the company group does not, organic artillery. A battle group would have a fighting chance of delaying any Argentine attack from capturing Mount Pleasant for long enough to allow reinforcements to arrive and could deploy a force to contest for the West Malvinas too. A company group has no such chance.
The Argentine army has a front line strength of 70,000 so even a battle group will not be able to defeat a determined landed Argentine attack indefinitely.
Evidently the current plan for defence of the islands does not rely on the army, so how does the second line of defence shape up? The second line of defence of the islands is the flight of four Typhoon Fighters operating out of RAF Mount Pleasant. This constitutes circa 3.7% of the RAF’s front line combat aircraft. At any time one or two of these four Typhoons will probably be in refit, maintenance or repair. Assuming a flight ratio of two pilots to one plane this would mean that each aircraft not in refit or repair could be airborne (assuming 5 hour shifts) for about 40% of the time. In other words, with a single flight stationed on the island, unless the ratio of pilots to planes is much higher than two, often only one, and occasionally zero British warplanes would be in the air. Whatever the pilots position this puts an alarming degree of reliance on the islands’ ground based radar systems (which are vulnerable to special forces attack) to detect an aerial attack in a timely fashion.
In 2014 Argentina attempted to acquire 20 Mirage F1 fighter jets from Spain, considered a deal to lease 12 Sukhoi Su-24 long range bombers from Russia and sought18 Kfir fighter jets from Israel. British diplomacy, and other factors, stymied these three deals but at the time it appeared that Argentina wanted to triple its interceptor force (from 14 to 44) and perhaps create a bombing force, too. By January 2015, Argentina had established a working group with the People’s Republic of China with a view to replacing the existing interceptor inventory with 14-20 Chinese FC-1 (called JF-17s when manufactured in Pakistan) or J-10 multirole war planes. Of the two the J-10s would be the more modern and potent. Mere replacement of the 2015 inventory would still leave Argentina able to engage the RAF at odds of three to one but unlike the old Mirages the Chinese planes are of a more recent design than the British Typhoons. The Typhoon probably is stronger than the FC-1 but the gap if Argentina acquired FC-1s would be narrower than it was in 2015 and if they acquired 20 J-10s and deployed them against the Malvinas the Typhoons would have little chance even if all four were airborne at the time of attack.
Unlike in 1982, The UK has no means, until 2019 or 2020 (when HMS Queen Elizabeth, whose sea trials begin in February and whose flight trials begin in July 2018, should complete working up its combat planes), to deploy air power for any campaign to retake the Malvinas.
To defend the Malvinas in a proportionate fashion, by which I mean without recourse to strategic assault, we must have more than a trip wire defence.
Given the weakness of the infantry company it is plain that the defence chiefs have determined that it is in the air that the Malvinas will be lost or won. But the current air defence does not shape up. We should increase the flight of four combat aircraft there to a squadron of twelve Typhoons. Permanent deployment of a strong squadron to the Malvinas would cost circa £220 million per year more than the current spend (circa £110 million) on a single flight but this would be a fraction of what it would cost to try to retake the Malvinas if they were lost.
It would also be prudent to deploy a second surface to air missile battery (ideally the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile system not another Rapier) at RAF Mount Pleasant to better defend any planes on the ground from surprise attack from the air. A Rapier surface to air missile battery (3 x launchers) can engage about six incoming targets simultaneously. With 14-20 Chinese multi-role war planes in mind a second battery is in order (as might be a third to a secondary base in West Malvinas were a base to be established there).
Usen ...
https://translate.google.com.ar/
para traducir...no me parece apropiado que yo lo traduzca, puedo terminar poniendo cualquier cosa...
de todos modos el texto es mas o menos claro...
https://translate.google.com.ar/
para traducir...no me parece apropiado que yo lo traduzca, puedo terminar poniendo cualquier cosa...
de todos modos el texto es mas o menos claro...
Raro, si copio y pego el link en google, me trae la nota, pero no si le hago clic desde aqui...
Segunda parte...
http://www.ukipdaily.com/category/debate/page/2/
si no les anda el link, pueden copiar la dirección y pegarla en google...
http://www.ukipdaily.com/category/debate/page/2/
si no les anda el link, pueden copiar la dirección y pegarla en google...
Coloco la nota de igual manera...
Home » debate » Preventing the Second Malvinas War Part II (Nov 2016 edition)
Preventing the Second Malvinas War Part II (Nov 2016 edition)
Posted on December 9, 2016 by Aidan Powlesland in debate // 3 Comments
[Ed:This is the second part of a 2 part article. Part I can be found here.]
The front line of defence of the Malvinas islands is the Royal Navy who deploy perhaps 3% of their strength in the South Atlantic in the form of a frigate or a destroyer and a nuclear fleet (hunter-killer) submarine from time to time.
It would be less tempting to a potentially gambling invader if a fleet submarine were deployed in the South Atlantic at all times. This would cost (including amortisation over 23 years), say, £70 million more per annum than is being spent at the moment to be there, say, 30% of the time. It is particularly needed since in the absence of air power and artillery a Trafalgar or Astute class submarine’s cruise missiles (it might be fifteen of them on board) are the only way, should an invading army arrive by air, of providing heavy fire support to any ground forces on the islands conducting a last ditch defence.
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have their pants down in the South Atlantic. The aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales may not be floated out until 2018 and won’t be fitted out until 2019, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth has no combat aircraft and the air force has no combat planes with the range, even with in-flight refueling, to rebase to (or bomb) the Malvinas from St Helena island (the nearest alternative base). In the last year the Royal Navy cut back its permanent destroyer or frigate presence and made it occasional.
The Malvinas Islands defence is only a trip wire. This is despite the fact that the existing defence is costing roughly £340 million per year. I suggest we increase that spending by circa £580 million per annum; £220 million to triple the number of Typhoons from four to twelve, £70 million to put afleet submarine, and £46 million to put an air-defence destroyer (not an anti-submarine Frigate), permanently on station and £90 million to increase the combat infantry from company to battle group strength. I would further propose £150 million per year to create (hardened and underground) maintenance and repair facilities for at least two fleet submarines. These facilities should have underwater access enabling the Malvinas to act as a base, for South Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean operations, from which submarines could come and go unobserved. Possible locations, where the seabed drops precipitously from the coast to below 50 metres depth, would include Punta Voluntario (Volunteer Point) (which has the advantage of being relatively close to the airport at Mount Pleasant) or New,Bird, or Beaver, Island (which are more remote). By the above measures we could be confident, firstly, that a belligerent but rational enemy government would be deterred from attack at all and, secondly, that an Argentine government, in particular, that did attack would be defeated.
Since October 2015, the short term air threat from Argentina has precipitously declined. Not only did the Foreign Office stymie the Argentine attempt to acquire the 20 Mirage F1 fighters from Spain, as well as reportedly playing a role in the collapse of the deal to acquire the 18 Kfir fighters from Israel, but in addition on 30-Nov-15, all existing Mirage war planes were de-commissioned on grounds of age and cost. The Argentine government has also changed. The new government is much less adversarial in its foreign policy rhetoric and has not yet acquired the Chinese warplanes (or Russian bombers) that were talked about in 2015. Moreover, in January 2016, with 31 out of 36 of Argentina’s Lockheed-Martin A-4AR Skyhawk jet fighter bombers already in storage, the remaining 4-5 were grounded for lack of spare parts. This leaves the air force with no jet powered fighter or bomber planes.
The Argentine working group with China, however, has not been terminated. According to the US Economic and Security Review Commission’s report of November 2015, the Chinese will construct five 1,800 ton “Malvinas” class corvettes for the Argentine navy. Each one comes with a helicopter, a 76mm main gun, 2 x twin surface-to-surface missile launching cells and 1 x octuple launching cell surface-to-air missile weapon. Potentially this flotilla could shoot down the four typhoons with its surface-to-air missiles, sink any Royal Navy warship on station with its surface-to-surface missiles and use its guns to bombard the islands whose infantry (if only a company is there) would not have the artillery with which to reply. Such a flotilla would still be vulnerable to the Royal Navy submarine but only if it was on station.
The Argentine working group with China has also agreed that the two countries will jointly construct 100+ amphibious armoured personell carriers which could be handy if one was wanting to land a lot of infantry from just off the Malvinas’ shores. It is reported that 10% of the uplink time to China’s satellites, from the new space tracking and control station that is being built by China in Argentina to provide China’s satellite network with a southern hemisphere node, will be made available to the Argentine government thus bestowing on Argentina the capacity, independent of borrowing US systems (which in 1982 the USA declined to provide), for observation from space of the South Atlantic by satellites we might hesitate to shoot down.
It is possible that the new Argentine government will cancel its £800 million deal with China for vehicles, corvettes and war planes. If so all the better a breathing space, I would say, to build up a reliable defence of the Malvinas archipelago.
The petroleum age may end within 25, or even 10 years, so perhaps the economic value of the archipelago will diminish (though it will increase first). Many must wonder as many, including the Labour party did in 1982, if the islands are worth any blood and treasure at all whether rich in oil or not?
The Argentine writer Georges Luis Borges said, of the 1982 Malvinas War, that observing it was like watching two bald men fighting over a comb.
But even if no drop of blood is worth any number of bejeweled isles then all the more reason, say I, to deter from temptation to action those who think differently.
Home » debate » Preventing the Second Malvinas War Part II (Nov 2016 edition)
Preventing the Second Malvinas War Part II (Nov 2016 edition)
Posted on December 9, 2016 by Aidan Powlesland in debate // 3 Comments
[Ed:This is the second part of a 2 part article. Part I can be found here.]
The front line of defence of the Malvinas islands is the Royal Navy who deploy perhaps 3% of their strength in the South Atlantic in the form of a frigate or a destroyer and a nuclear fleet (hunter-killer) submarine from time to time.
It would be less tempting to a potentially gambling invader if a fleet submarine were deployed in the South Atlantic at all times. This would cost (including amortisation over 23 years), say, £70 million more per annum than is being spent at the moment to be there, say, 30% of the time. It is particularly needed since in the absence of air power and artillery a Trafalgar or Astute class submarine’s cruise missiles (it might be fifteen of them on board) are the only way, should an invading army arrive by air, of providing heavy fire support to any ground forces on the islands conducting a last ditch defence.
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have their pants down in the South Atlantic. The aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales may not be floated out until 2018 and won’t be fitted out until 2019, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth has no combat aircraft and the air force has no combat planes with the range, even with in-flight refueling, to rebase to (or bomb) the Malvinas from St Helena island (the nearest alternative base). In the last year the Royal Navy cut back its permanent destroyer or frigate presence and made it occasional.
The Malvinas Islands defence is only a trip wire. This is despite the fact that the existing defence is costing roughly £340 million per year. I suggest we increase that spending by circa £580 million per annum; £220 million to triple the number of Typhoons from four to twelve, £70 million to put afleet submarine, and £46 million to put an air-defence destroyer (not an anti-submarine Frigate), permanently on station and £90 million to increase the combat infantry from company to battle group strength. I would further propose £150 million per year to create (hardened and underground) maintenance and repair facilities for at least two fleet submarines. These facilities should have underwater access enabling the Malvinas to act as a base, for South Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean operations, from which submarines could come and go unobserved. Possible locations, where the seabed drops precipitously from the coast to below 50 metres depth, would include Punta Voluntario (Volunteer Point) (which has the advantage of being relatively close to the airport at Mount Pleasant) or New,Bird, or Beaver, Island (which are more remote). By the above measures we could be confident, firstly, that a belligerent but rational enemy government would be deterred from attack at all and, secondly, that an Argentine government, in particular, that did attack would be defeated.
Since October 2015, the short term air threat from Argentina has precipitously declined. Not only did the Foreign Office stymie the Argentine attempt to acquire the 20 Mirage F1 fighters from Spain, as well as reportedly playing a role in the collapse of the deal to acquire the 18 Kfir fighters from Israel, but in addition on 30-Nov-15, all existing Mirage war planes were de-commissioned on grounds of age and cost. The Argentine government has also changed. The new government is much less adversarial in its foreign policy rhetoric and has not yet acquired the Chinese warplanes (or Russian bombers) that were talked about in 2015. Moreover, in January 2016, with 31 out of 36 of Argentina’s Lockheed-Martin A-4AR Skyhawk jet fighter bombers already in storage, the remaining 4-5 were grounded for lack of spare parts. This leaves the air force with no jet powered fighter or bomber planes.
The Argentine working group with China, however, has not been terminated. According to the US Economic and Security Review Commission’s report of November 2015, the Chinese will construct five 1,800 ton “Malvinas” class corvettes for the Argentine navy. Each one comes with a helicopter, a 76mm main gun, 2 x twin surface-to-surface missile launching cells and 1 x octuple launching cell surface-to-air missile weapon. Potentially this flotilla could shoot down the four typhoons with its surface-to-air missiles, sink any Royal Navy warship on station with its surface-to-surface missiles and use its guns to bombard the islands whose infantry (if only a company is there) would not have the artillery with which to reply. Such a flotilla would still be vulnerable to the Royal Navy submarine but only if it was on station.
The Argentine working group with China has also agreed that the two countries will jointly construct 100+ amphibious armoured personell carriers which could be handy if one was wanting to land a lot of infantry from just off the Malvinas’ shores. It is reported that 10% of the uplink time to China’s satellites, from the new space tracking and control station that is being built by China in Argentina to provide China’s satellite network with a southern hemisphere node, will be made available to the Argentine government thus bestowing on Argentina the capacity, independent of borrowing US systems (which in 1982 the USA declined to provide), for observation from space of the South Atlantic by satellites we might hesitate to shoot down.
It is possible that the new Argentine government will cancel its £800 million deal with China for vehicles, corvettes and war planes. If so all the better a breathing space, I would say, to build up a reliable defence of the Malvinas archipelago.
The petroleum age may end within 25, or even 10 years, so perhaps the economic value of the archipelago will diminish (though it will increase first). Many must wonder as many, including the Labour party did in 1982, if the islands are worth any blood and treasure at all whether rich in oil or not?
The Argentine writer Georges Luis Borges said, of the 1982 Malvinas War, that observing it was like watching two bald men fighting over a comb.
But even if no drop of blood is worth any number of bejeweled isles then all the more reason, say I, to deter from temptation to action those who think differently.
Google Translator anda bastante bien...
Que cagaso que tenian por el posible rearme con material chino!!!
De todos modos, veo que es mas un ensayo (está en la sección debates) que una información concreta.
De todos modos, veo que es mas un ensayo (está en la sección debates) que una información concreta.
VizacachaDISCULPEN SE QUE NO ES EL LUGAR CORRECTO, PERO ESTA FOTO ES RARA, ES DE NUESTRAS MALVINAS
¿QUE HACE ESTE EN LAS ISLAS?
POR LO MENOS UNA PUBLICACION NO EN ESPAÑOL ASI LO MUESTRA COMO QUE ESTE PAJARO ESTABA EN NUESTRAS ISLAS !!!
Tengo seria dudas será o no??
Este C-5 por el esquema e inscripcion MAC corresponde a una fotografia de los años 80.
Por los montes de formacion volcanica y la radioayuda ubicada en uno de ellos,esta fotografia esta tomada en Ascension,en la Base Aerea WIDEAWAKE.
Los C-5 y C-141 transportaron efectos hacia Ascension desde USA para apoyar a la TF 317.
Muchas gracias buscando viejas fotos de Malvinas, en paginas en ingles surgió esto, y como de temas aeronáuticos no se nada, me genero serias dudas, gracias por aclarármelo.-
Vizcacha
No se si ya se publicó antes.
https://www.Malvinas.gov.fk/our-people/our-history/
La historia contada en la página de Malvinas Goverment
Historical dates
1592 First recorded sighting on August 14, by English sea captain John Davis in the ship ‘Desire’.
1594 First recorded claim on February 2, by Richard Hawkins for Queen Elizabeth I
1690 First recorded landing made by English navigator, Captain John Strong in his ship the ‘Welfare’. He named the channel dividing the two main islands ‘Malvinas Sound’ after Viscount Malvinas, then Treasurer of the Royal Navy.
Over the years several French ships visited the Islands, which they called Les Iles Malouines after the French port of St. Malo.
1740 Lord Anson passed the Islands on an exploration voyage and urged Britain to consider them as a preliminary step to establishing a base near Cape Horn.
1764 The French diplomat and explorer, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, established a settlement at Port Louis on East Malvinas.
1765 Unaware of the French settlement, Commodore John Byron landed at Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) on West Malvinas and took possession of the Islands for the British Crown.
1766 Captain John MacBride established a British settlement at Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont).
The Spanish Government protested about the French settlement and Bougainville was forced to surrender his interests in the Islands in return for an agreed sum of money. A Spanish Governor was appointed and Port Louis was renamed Puerto de la Soledad, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Captain-General of Buenos Aires; then a Spanish colony.
1770 British forced from Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) by the Spanish.
1771 Serious diplomatic negotiations involving Britain, Spain and France produce the Exchange of Declarations, whereby Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) was restored to Britain.
1774 Britain withdrew from Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) on economic grounds as part of a redeployment of forces due to the approaching American War of Independence, leaving behind a plaque as the mark of continuing British sovereignty.
1786 Lieutenant Thomas Edgar RN charts West Malvinas island.
1811 The Spanish garrison withdrew from Puerto de la Soledad. At this time, South American colonies were in a state of revolt against Spain.
1816 The provinces which constituted the old Spanish vice-royalty declared independence from Spain as the United Provinces of the River Plate. Spain refused to recognise any such independence.
1820 A Buenos Aires privateer claimed the Malvinas Islands in what was probably an unauthorised act – which was never reported to the Buenos Aires government. No occupation followed this.
1823 A private attempt was made to establish a settlement on the Islands, but this failed after a few months. The organisers requested the Buenos Aires government to appoint one of their employees the unpaid ‘Commander’ of the settlement.
1825 Britain and the Government of Buenos Aires signed a Treaty of Amity, Trade and Navigation without including and recognition of territory or legal rights.
1826 Louis Vernet, a naturalised citizen of Buenos Aires (originally French with German connections), undertook a private venture and established a new settlement at Puerto de la Soledad, having first informed the British Consul.
1829 Buenos Aires announced a claim to the Malvinas Islands based on inheritance from Spain. Luis Vernet was appointed unpaid Commander of Soledad and Tierra del Fuego. Britain registered a formal protest, asserting her own sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands.
Vernet made the first of several approaches to Britain then to re-assert its sovereignty over the Islands. Earlier he had got the British Consul in Buenos Aires to countersign his land grants.
1831 Vernet seized three American sealing ships, in an attempt to control fishing in Malvinas waters. In retaliation, the US sloop ‘Lexington’ destroyed Puerto de la Soledad, and proclaimed the Islands ‘free of all government’. Most of the settlers were persuaded to leave on board the ‘Lexington’.
1832 Diplomatic relations between the US and Argentina broke down until 1844. Supporting Britain, the US questioned the claim that all Spanish possessions had been transferred to the Government of Buenos Aires and confirmed its use of the Malvinas as a fishing base for over 50 years. The US declared that Spain had exercised no sovereignty over several coasts to which Buenos Aires claimed to be heir, including Patagonia.
Buenos Aires appointed an interim Commander to the Islands, Commander Mestivier, who arrived in October (with a tiny garrison and some convicts). Britain’s Minister protested once more.
December 20, Commander Onslow, aboard Clio, returned to Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) and rebuilds the fort.
1833 Commander Mestivier had been murdered by his own men by the time Captain Onslow sailed from Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) in the warship ‘Clio’ and took command of Port Louis for Britain. The remains of the garrison from Buenos Aires left peacefully.
Buenos Aires protested, only to be told: “The British Government upon this occasion has only exercised its full and undoubted right … The British Government at one time thought it inexpedient to maintain any Garrison in those Islands: It has now altered its views, and has deemed it proper to establish a Post there.”
Since this time, British administration has remained unbroken apart from a ten week Argentine occupation in 1982.
1845 Stanley officially became the capital of the Islands when Governor Moody moved the administration from Port Louis. The capital was so named after the Colonial Secretary of the day, Edward Geoffrey Smith Stanley, 14th Earl of Derby.
1914 Battle of the Malvinas Islands, one of the major naval engagements of the First World War in which British victory secured the Cape Horn passage for the remainder of the war.
1947 The Malvinas Islands are listed at the United Nations as a Non-Self Governing Territory (NSGT) subject to the UN’s decolonisation process.
1960 UN Resolution 1514 grants the right of Self-Determination to all peoples of NSGTs.
1965 United Nations Assembly passed Resolution 2065, following lobbying by Argentina. This reminded members of the organisation’s pledge to end all forms of colonialism. Argentine and British Governments were called upon to negotiate a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, bringing the issue to international attention formally for the first time.
1966 Through diplomatic channels, Britain and Argentina began discussions in response to UN Assembly pressure.
1967 The Malvinas Islands Emergency Committee was set up by influential supporters in the UK to lobby the British Government against any weakening on the sovereignty issue. In April, the Foreign Secretary assured the House of Commons that the Islanders’ interests were paramount in any discussions with Argentina.
1971 Communications Agreement was signed by the British and Argentine governments whereby external communications would be provided to the Malvinas Islands by Argentina.
1982 On 2 April Argentina invaded the Malvinas Islands and diplomatic relations between the two nations were broken off. Argentine troops occupied the Islands for ten weeks before being defeated by the British. The Argentines surrendered on 14 June, now known as Liberation Day.
1990 Diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina were restored.
1999 At the instigation of, and with the involvement of, Malvinas Islands Councillors, a Joint Statement was signed between the British and Argentine Governments on 14 July. This was designed ‘to build confidence and reduce tension’ between the Islands and Argentina. Two Councillors from the Islands witnessed the signing on behalf of the Malvinas Islands Government.
2009 Following almost ten years of discussion and negotiation, a new Constitution for the Malvinas Islands took effect on 1 January 2009. Marking an important milestone in the history of the Malvinas Islands, the new Constitution provides enhanced local democracy and internal self-government, and enshrines the right of self-determination.
2013 Referendum held in March, overseen by international observers. Malvinas Islanders voted to determine their future, 99.8% of the electorate voted YES to maintaining current political status as a British Overseas Territory.
https://www.Malvinas.gov.fk/our-people/our-history/
La historia contada en la página de Malvinas Goverment
Historical dates
1592 First recorded sighting on August 14, by English sea captain John Davis in the ship ‘Desire’.
1594 First recorded claim on February 2, by Richard Hawkins for Queen Elizabeth I
1690 First recorded landing made by English navigator, Captain John Strong in his ship the ‘Welfare’. He named the channel dividing the two main islands ‘Malvinas Sound’ after Viscount Malvinas, then Treasurer of the Royal Navy.
Over the years several French ships visited the Islands, which they called Les Iles Malouines after the French port of St. Malo.
1740 Lord Anson passed the Islands on an exploration voyage and urged Britain to consider them as a preliminary step to establishing a base near Cape Horn.
1764 The French diplomat and explorer, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, established a settlement at Port Louis on East Malvinas.
1765 Unaware of the French settlement, Commodore John Byron landed at Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) on West Malvinas and took possession of the Islands for the British Crown.
1766 Captain John MacBride established a British settlement at Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont).
The Spanish Government protested about the French settlement and Bougainville was forced to surrender his interests in the Islands in return for an agreed sum of money. A Spanish Governor was appointed and Port Louis was renamed Puerto de la Soledad, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Captain-General of Buenos Aires; then a Spanish colony.
1770 British forced from Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) by the Spanish.
1771 Serious diplomatic negotiations involving Britain, Spain and France produce the Exchange of Declarations, whereby Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) was restored to Britain.
1774 Britain withdrew from Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) on economic grounds as part of a redeployment of forces due to the approaching American War of Independence, leaving behind a plaque as the mark of continuing British sovereignty.
1786 Lieutenant Thomas Edgar RN charts West Malvinas island.
1811 The Spanish garrison withdrew from Puerto de la Soledad. At this time, South American colonies were in a state of revolt against Spain.
1816 The provinces which constituted the old Spanish vice-royalty declared independence from Spain as the United Provinces of the River Plate. Spain refused to recognise any such independence.
1820 A Buenos Aires privateer claimed the Malvinas Islands in what was probably an unauthorised act – which was never reported to the Buenos Aires government. No occupation followed this.
1823 A private attempt was made to establish a settlement on the Islands, but this failed after a few months. The organisers requested the Buenos Aires government to appoint one of their employees the unpaid ‘Commander’ of the settlement.
1825 Britain and the Government of Buenos Aires signed a Treaty of Amity, Trade and Navigation without including and recognition of territory or legal rights.
1826 Louis Vernet, a naturalised citizen of Buenos Aires (originally French with German connections), undertook a private venture and established a new settlement at Puerto de la Soledad, having first informed the British Consul.
1829 Buenos Aires announced a claim to the Malvinas Islands based on inheritance from Spain. Luis Vernet was appointed unpaid Commander of Soledad and Tierra del Fuego. Britain registered a formal protest, asserting her own sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands.
Vernet made the first of several approaches to Britain then to re-assert its sovereignty over the Islands. Earlier he had got the British Consul in Buenos Aires to countersign his land grants.
1831 Vernet seized three American sealing ships, in an attempt to control fishing in Malvinas waters. In retaliation, the US sloop ‘Lexington’ destroyed Puerto de la Soledad, and proclaimed the Islands ‘free of all government’. Most of the settlers were persuaded to leave on board the ‘Lexington’.
1832 Diplomatic relations between the US and Argentina broke down until 1844. Supporting Britain, the US questioned the claim that all Spanish possessions had been transferred to the Government of Buenos Aires and confirmed its use of the Malvinas as a fishing base for over 50 years. The US declared that Spain had exercised no sovereignty over several coasts to which Buenos Aires claimed to be heir, including Patagonia.
Buenos Aires appointed an interim Commander to the Islands, Commander Mestivier, who arrived in October (with a tiny garrison and some convicts). Britain’s Minister protested once more.
December 20, Commander Onslow, aboard Clio, returned to Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) and rebuilds the fort.
1833 Commander Mestivier had been murdered by his own men by the time Captain Onslow sailed from Puerto de la Cruzada (Port Egmont) in the warship ‘Clio’ and took command of Port Louis for Britain. The remains of the garrison from Buenos Aires left peacefully.
Buenos Aires protested, only to be told: “The British Government upon this occasion has only exercised its full and undoubted right … The British Government at one time thought it inexpedient to maintain any Garrison in those Islands: It has now altered its views, and has deemed it proper to establish a Post there.”
Since this time, British administration has remained unbroken apart from a ten week Argentine occupation in 1982.
1845 Stanley officially became the capital of the Islands when Governor Moody moved the administration from Port Louis. The capital was so named after the Colonial Secretary of the day, Edward Geoffrey Smith Stanley, 14th Earl of Derby.
1914 Battle of the Malvinas Islands, one of the major naval engagements of the First World War in which British victory secured the Cape Horn passage for the remainder of the war.
1947 The Malvinas Islands are listed at the United Nations as a Non-Self Governing Territory (NSGT) subject to the UN’s decolonisation process.
1960 UN Resolution 1514 grants the right of Self-Determination to all peoples of NSGTs.
1965 United Nations Assembly passed Resolution 2065, following lobbying by Argentina. This reminded members of the organisation’s pledge to end all forms of colonialism. Argentine and British Governments were called upon to negotiate a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, bringing the issue to international attention formally for the first time.
1966 Through diplomatic channels, Britain and Argentina began discussions in response to UN Assembly pressure.
1967 The Malvinas Islands Emergency Committee was set up by influential supporters in the UK to lobby the British Government against any weakening on the sovereignty issue. In April, the Foreign Secretary assured the House of Commons that the Islanders’ interests were paramount in any discussions with Argentina.
1971 Communications Agreement was signed by the British and Argentine governments whereby external communications would be provided to the Malvinas Islands by Argentina.
1982 On 2 April Argentina invaded the Malvinas Islands and diplomatic relations between the two nations were broken off. Argentine troops occupied the Islands for ten weeks before being defeated by the British. The Argentines surrendered on 14 June, now known as Liberation Day.
1990 Diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina were restored.
1999 At the instigation of, and with the involvement of, Malvinas Islands Councillors, a Joint Statement was signed between the British and Argentine Governments on 14 July. This was designed ‘to build confidence and reduce tension’ between the Islands and Argentina. Two Councillors from the Islands witnessed the signing on behalf of the Malvinas Islands Government.
2009 Following almost ten years of discussion and negotiation, a new Constitution for the Malvinas Islands took effect on 1 January 2009. Marking an important milestone in the history of the Malvinas Islands, the new Constitution provides enhanced local democracy and internal self-government, and enshrines the right of self-determination.
2013 Referendum held in March, overseen by international observers. Malvinas Islanders voted to determine their future, 99.8% of the electorate voted YES to maintaining current political status as a British Overseas Territory.
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