AESAsssss
Hay mucho "mentidero" dando vueltas por el ambiente sobre los radares y armas...
1. Lee "Super Hornet Radar Not Ready For Combat" en...
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gene...dline=Super Hornet Radar Not Ready For Combat
2. Sobre radares AESA y el F-22 (claro que son europeos...)
http://arismartin.com/viewtopic.php?t=262
3. En un portal amigo hay un detalle excelente sobre alcances que subió Growler (Radares Aerotransportados)
Pero... la cuestión pasa por saber cual es el RCS del Kh-172. Para calcular la RCS fijate en
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_cross_section
Será como el de un F/A-18E, o un Typhon o un Rafale (0,1 m2) ???
112 Km - AN/APG-77 AESA F-22 Raptor
98 Km - AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA F-15C Eagle
90 Km – AN/APG-81 AESA F-35 Lighting II
75 Km - – AN/APG-80 AESA F-16E/F Block 60
72 Km – AN/APG-79 AESA Super Hornet Block II
70 Km - Captor – Typhoon Tranch 2
51 Km – AN/APG-63(V)1 F-15C Eagle
49 Km– RBE-2 (Dassault Rafale)
44 Km - APG-68(V)9 F-16 Block 50
33 Km - AN/APG-68(V)5 & RDY (F-16C B40 & M2000-5)
32 Km - PS-05A JAS-39 Gripen
RCS = Radar Cross Section
Finalmente, una cosa es que el radar (AESA or not AESA) del avión pueda detectar al misil entrante.
Otra es que pueda destruirlo ANTES que cause daño...
En MLV varios buques británicos "vieron llegar" tanto a los Exocets, cuanto a los A-4B/C, a los Mirage, etc. No siempre pudieron detenerlos. Buena prueba de ello está en el fondo del Océano Atlántico para recordarnos que no todo es ver venir... :yonofui:
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Te encontré mas info sobre el problema que representa el uso de Contramedidas contra misiles crucero (que no son los más rápidos ni los más ágiles...)
“A cruise missile is not constrained to follow a single path to its target and can, in fact, follow a devious route to avoid obstacles and terrain, to hide below the tracker's line of sight, and to deceive defenders. While the thrust-to-weight ratio need not be large to maintain cruising flight, a cruise missile is easily designed to pull significant g load factors, allowing it to change direction quickly. Hence, it can jink, S-turn, and feint on the way to its target. It can approach its target a few meters above the surface or pull up and dive on its target at a high angle. To limit the ability of defending forces to maintain its trajectory in track, a given cruise missile can be programmed to choose apparently random approach maneuvers.
Unlike a ballistic missile engagement, a successful intercept of a cruise missile before it approaches its target virtually assures that the cruise missile will fail to accomplish its mission. Furthermore, less damage may be necessary to defeat a cruise missile than to defeat a ballistic missile.
Such a missile need not always be totally destroyed—degraded performance in the form of diminished accuracy for the guidance sensors or a partial loss of aerodynamic control authority may be enough to cause it to miss its intended target. Cruise missiles can attack both stationary and mobile targets. If a movable target is stationary for an extended period of time, the missile may be programmed to fly to the global positioning system (GPS) coordinate where the target is known to be located. Worldwide open access to the GPS and GLONASS (the Russian equivalent of GPS) networks simplifies the navigation and guidance systems for cruise missiles designed to attack fixed targets. Ten-meter navigational accuracy to any latitude-longitude pair is readily obtainable now that GPS selective availability (SA) has been turned off. One-hundred-meter accuracy is available with SA operating. In a major conflict, the United States might take measures to restrict the local availability of GPS to its adversaries. However, there is no precedent to indicate that during low-intensity operations, the operation of GPS will be restricted. Cruise missile attacks on moving targets are multistep processes. First, the missile must be guided to fly to a point where, based on a target track developed by an external sensor, there is reason to expect that the terminal sensor on the cruise missile will be able to acquire the intended target. If the intended target is within the acquisition basket of the missile's seeker, the seeker can acquire the target and the missile can guide itself on a collision course to the target.
A wide variety of seekers have been developed to support the terminal engagement phase of cruise missile attacks. If the cruise missile does not have a data link back to an individual who can evaluate the output of the cruise missile's sensor and control the terminal engagement, it must be guided to the target autonomously.
Autonomous guidance sensors are subject to jamming, deception, and decoys.
ECMs against missile guidance and navigation systems have been employed since World War II, as have electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques that are designed to negate the effects of defensive countermeasures. The ECM-ECCM battle is open-ended and will continue indefinitely into the future. The sensors on the newest missiles that are entering into the operational inventories of potential adversaries appear to have extremely robust ECCM capabilities against current ECM techniques. Advances in techniques related to automatic target recognition (ATR) tend to make seekers robust against distraction decoys. On the other hand, the fidelity with which modern decoys or repeaters can replicate the signature of the target of a cruise missile is impressive. Clearly, the Navy must continue an aggressive ECM program so that as new advances in seeker technology are fielded, new countermeasures will be available to negate them.
Aside from the threat that improved cruise missile seekers pose to Navy ECM techniques, there are many trends in cruise missile design that the committee found to be a source of concern, including the following:
· Greater missile speeds, which limits the engagement time;
· Lower RCSs, which limits the range within which a missile may be detected once it has crossed the horizon of defensive radars;
· High maneuverability, which limits the ability of a defensive system to track and engage the missiles;
· Trajectories that make maximum use of terrain obscuration and clutter masking in littoral situations; and
· Sea-skimming flight paths, which keep incoming missiles below the horizon of defensive radars for as long as possible.
Worldwide, cruise missile designs abound. Many of these designs already stress the capabilities of U.S. defensive systems. Table 2.1 lists some of the worst-case parameters of currently operational missiles and the committee's projections for the parameters that may be encountered in the next 15 to 20 years, based on its assessment of trends in technology. The first four attributes listed in Table 2.1 are intended to limit the options for engagement by defensive missiles. The fifth and sixth attributes attempt to defeat defensive ECM techniques. The committee's estimates for 2020 are extrapolated from current trends in missile technology. The sixth could leapfrog future ECM efforts. Although some members of the committee doubt that accelerations of 20+ g will be feasible, all of them concur that future cruise missiles will possess greater agility than currently deployed threat missiles.
As missiles become more agile, the data rates of defensive systems must be increased and the track association algorithms of defensive sensors will require major modifications.
Even if the RCS values of threat missiles do not decrease, their greater agility and speed will challenge the tracking algorithms and data rates of existing defensive systems.”
