Gracias. No sabia....!
ARA Bouchard. ¿Torpedo que no explotó?
- Tema iniciado cibertongas
- Fecha de inicio
Gracias. No sabia....!
Hay mucho en ingles y se que no se puede. Si les parece quitenlo.
ON APRIL 2, 1982 Argentina invaded the Malvinas Islands. Margaret Thatcher’s Government survived this humiliation by being able to announce to Parliament the next day that a substantial task force would soon set sail with the objective of “restoring British administration”.
It was widely assumed that the main value of this force was in strengthening the country’s bargaining position in the inevitable attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the emergency.
By the end of the month that assumption no longer looked so strong. On April 29 President Reagan came out in Britain’s support. Meanwhile the British had retaken South Georgia, a dependency of the Malvinas, and the main carrier battle group was getting into position to enforce a 200-mile total exclusion zone which Britain had declared to prevent Argentina reinforcing its garrison on the Malvinas. In addition it would be looking to persuade the Argentine Navy and Air Force out to fight in the hope of causing them severe damage. This was to prepare for an eventual landing on the Malvinas.
To provoke the Argentinians into action, Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, commanding the task force in the South Atlantic, decided to give the impression that the landings had already begun. This began early on May 1 with naval bombardments and air raids against military targets. According to Woodward, the aim was to “provoke a reaction that would allow me to conduct a major attrition exercise”, and in this he was successful. Aircraft flew from Argentine bases to confront the British and they suffered significant losses when challenged by the British Sea Harriers.
UN POCO FALSO LO DEL EXITO VISTA LAS BAJAS NAVALES SUFRIDAS POR UK
The Argentine Navy also prepared to fight the Royal Navy. During the evening of May 1 Admiral Jorge Allara, on board the Argentine aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, was gearing up to mount an attack. His tracker aircraft had picked up signs of British warships 120 miles away and he was aware of the reports from the Malvinas of attempted British landings. Admiral Juan Lombardo, Commander South Atlantic, had given him new rules of engagement, allowing for attacks on the British fleet without restriction. As the carrier group moved from the north a group led by the cruiser General Belgrano would move to the south of the exclusion zone to attack any British units there using the Exocet anti-ship missiles on the destroyers accompanying the cruiser, whose own 6in guns outranged the 4.5in guns used by the British.
PENSAMIENTO ILOGICO PERO QUE JUSTIFICA LA RESPUESTA. ¿A QUÉ SE PODÍA ACERCAR EL BELGRANO SIN SER DETECTADO Y ATACADO A SU VEZ MUCHO ANTES? ¿ALGUN BUQUE AISLADO? NO CREIBLE.
The British plan was to attack the 25 de Mayo as soon as possible. The previous week the military had persuaded the War Cabinet to change the rules of engagement to allow a nuclear submarine to attack the carrier even outside the total exclusion zone, on the ground that the range of its aircraft would mean that it was a threat to British ships.
CIERTO PERO FUE UK LA QUE PUSO LA ZONA DE EXCLUSION. SI NO HUBIERA EXISTIDO CUALQUIER LUGAR HUBIERA SIDO BUENO PARA ATACAR, HASTA EN PUERTO. DE TODOS MODOS ERA UNA DECLARACION UNILATERAL SIN VALOR LEGAL NI CONTRA EL DIH.
LA CULPA FUE NUESTRA POR CREERLES.
Unfortunately for this plan, the carrier had avoided detection and was now closing in on the task force. Woodward knew this not only from intelligence on the Argentine orders to attack but also from one of his Sea Harriers that had come across the Argentine carrier group. At the same time another submarine, HMS Conqueror, had found the Belgrano group and was trailing it, but it had no permission to attack unless the group entered the exclusion zone (which intelligence had suggested it was going to do).
Woodward’s war diary noted that: “The Belgrano group is moving west [actually it was moving east], south of the Malvinas Islands shadowed by Conqueror, and may wish to effect a pincer movement from that direction.” He suspected an attack by dawn on May 2 and so decided to concentrate his forces into defensive positions. Once he had got his ships together, Woodward began to feel a bit less exposed. Yet he was frustrated by the fact that he was not able to command the submarines directly and by Conqueror’s restricted rules of engagement. At issue was not just whether he could cope with an immediate Argentine offensive but the inhibitions that would be placed on his ability to move the British campaign along over the coming days. This frustration led him to order Conqueror to attack the Belgrano. As he anticipated, because of his lack of authority over Conqueror, the order was immediately rescinded.
As he also anticipated, this episode was brought to the attention of the Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, Chief of Defence Staff, who immediately sought political agreement for a change in the rules so that British ships and submarines could attack all Argentine naval ships, submarines and auxiliaries outside the total exclusion zone. At midday on May 2, as they gathered at Chequers to consider the course of the campaign, members of the War Cabinet were asked for a quick decision. The discussion took no more than 20 minutes. William Whitelaw later recalled it as “one of the simplest decisions that I personally found myself involved in”. Particularly compelling was the question of what the politicians would say if they had refused the military request when the Belgrano could have been sunk, and the cruiser then went on to sink a British carrier with hundreds of casualties. All were asked for their views before the Prime Minister gave her own but the issue was not controversial.
In the only official report, the decision was said to reflect “the latest intelligence about the movements and intentions of the Argentine fleet, and that of the new situation created by the military events of May 1”. Although the change of rules meant that the attack could take place outside the exclusion zone, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office later noted: “Ministers had also taken into account the fact that, in the present military situation, it was unlikely that any warships would need to be engaged very far from the exclusion zone.” Soon the new rules were being transmitted to the submarines.
By this time the situation had changed. Up to the early hours of May 2, the British had interpreted Argentine intentions correctly. Allara intended to use his Skyhawks to attack the British fleet and the Belgrano was part of a pincer. At this point, however, two developments changed the Argentine plans. First the wind dropped. Launching the Skyhawks required 40 knots. The wind continued to drop and the prospect now was of further delay and the aircraft taking off with reduced fuel and weapons loaded. Nonetheless, the group continued to close on the British.
The second event was the arrival of the Sea Harrier that had spotted the carrier group (convincing Woodward of the danger he faced). Although Allara’s initial instinct was to persevere, having been told by Lombardo that he did not know the position of the British carriers, so that the “free-ranging enemy still constitutes a strong threat”, he decided that there was little point in carrying on. The forecast gave him few reasons to expect better wind conditions. The task groups were ordered “back to their former positions”.
For most of the Sunday morning Woodward had no inkling of any change in Argentine plans but by 1100 GMT (0800 local time), with the light improving, the probability of an Argentine attack was diminishing. Woodward, however, was by no means confident. Only when it became dark did he intend to move west again to attack Argentine targets on the Malvinas with naval gunfire. He knew that the Belgrano group was still being trailed by Conqueror; but not that it had reversed course two hours earlier. At 1400 GMT Conqueror reported the Belgrano’s new course to its headquarters at Northwood, but this information was not passed on to Woodward.
If it had been, Woodward’s reaction would have been the same as Northwood’s. A move in one direction could be followed by a move in the other. Concluding that an Argentine attack was not imminent was not the same as presuming that it had been postponed indefinitely. In terms of his original plan to flush out Argentine units, the best prospect he had now in terms of attrition was the Belgrano group. If it was not attacked that day then it would be returning to the fray the next time the Argentine Navy positioned itself for battle, by which time Conqueror could well have lost its contact. Woodward did not know that his wish had been granted, and approval for the new rules of engagement had already been agreed and transmitted to the submarines. He therefore again requested permission for Conqueror to attack the Belgrano.
EN ESENCIA: CAMBIOS CONTINUOS DE RUMBO DEL BELGRANO DE E A O Y VICEVERSA HACIAN IMPREDECIBLE SU ACCION FUTURA. POSIBILIDAD DE PERDERLO (HUMMM...)
RIESGO DE ATAQUE A FLOTA PRINCIPAL POR EL GRUPO "25 DE MAYO" (SUPUESTAMENTE NO HECHO POR FALTA DE VIENTOS FAVORABLES AL DESPEGUE...)
RIESGO QUE EL BELGRANO, CAMBIANDO DE RUMBO UNA VEZ MAS SE ACERQUE A ALGO Y ATAQUE CON SUS CAÑONES MUY SUPERIORES DEFENDIDO DEL PUNTO DE VISTA AEREO POR LOS SEA DART DE LA ESCOLTA...
MALENTENDIDOD, ENETENDIDOS, ORDENES Y CONTRAORDENES, PROBLEMAS EN EL MASTIL DE COMUNICACIONES, REGLAS DE ENGAGEMENT NO CLARAS, SUB FUERA DE COMANDO DEL JEFE DE FLOTA POR SER NUKE, ETC, EN EL SUB (QUE AL FINAL, POR LO QUE SEA, SI TUVO ORDENES CLARAS)
Captain Chris Wreford-Brown on Conqueror had begun May 2 expecting to
be following the Belgrano into the exclusion zone. He had been surprised by its change in course and remained uncertain as to which direction his quarry was intending to move for some time as it skirted the exclusion zone, perhaps aware of its vulnerability should it stray inside, and stayed some 18 miles to the south but still moving east. When Conqueror returned to periscope depth at 1400 GMT to receive and transmit signals, it reported on the change of direction to the west. Conqueror, however, had been suffering for some time with communication problems as a result of a damaged wireless mast (the crew had thought it might be necessary to withdraw to get the mast changed). Initially all Wreford-Brown understood was that the rules of engagement had changed: exactly how was unclear. He was aware of an order cancelling a previous order to attack (the original from Woodward — which he had not received) and that there appeared to be a new order to attack. Conqueror remained at depth until his instructions were clear. Now he was “absolutely certain”.
By the next transmission, at 1710, they were understood and this was reported back along with an intention to attack. Wreford-Brown chose the old Mk8 torpedo, in service since 1932, because as an impact weapon it had a better chance of penetrating the cruiser’s armour and anti-torpedo bilges.
SE ELIGIO EL VIEJO MK8 PUES PODIA PENETRAR LA ARMADURA....Y ERA MAS BARATO
EN OTRO BLOG DE SUBMARINISTAS SE DICE QUE LA DOCTRINA BRITANICA SON TRES TORPEDOS: PROA. MEDIO, POPA QUE ASEGURA AL MENOS DOS IMPACTOS.
At 18.57 Conqueror attacked at a range of 1,400 yards. Two hits were observed, although three explosions were heard.
DOS IMPACTOS SE OBSERVAN AUNQUE SE ESCUCHARON TRES EXPLOSIONES.
By 19.30 the initial report of the attack had been transmitted. This gave the cruiser's position, course and speed when attacked, adding “successfully attacked Belgrano. Two hits with Mark Eights. Evaded to east”. The evasion was necessary because within a few minutes they were being attacked in turn with depth charges. From 20.52 to 21.03 more depth charges were heard.
On board the Belgrano some 200 men had been killed by the initial explosion, with fire spreading because doors and hatches had been left open. Another 850 took to life rafts as the cruiser began to sink. It sent out no signal of its own asking for help. The harsh weather and heavy sea conditions battered the crippled vessel and reduced the chances for survival of the crew as they abandoned ship. It took a day before the first survivors were picked up. In all 321 men of the Belgrano lost their lives.
Militarily this had exactly the effect required: the Argentine Navy did not venture out again. Politically it caused Britain damage, for the scale of the attack appeared disproportionate and the circumstances suggested that Britain was not following its own rules.
CIERTO, Y QUÉ? DESDE CUANDO SE SIGUEN LAS REGLAS EN LAS GUERRAS...
After the war this led to claims that the attack had been ordered by the Prime Minister to make sure that there was no peace settlement. In fact the diplomatic fallout from the attack led the British to take peace initiatives much more seriously than before. The conspiracy theories were always wide of the mark. The Belgrano was sunk not because the British Government was confident in an inevitable military victory but because there was a serious risk of defeat.
VER PARA CREER. ACEPTAR ESO, MAS QUE DUDOSO, ES ACEPTAR CUALQUIER EXCUSA. DE TODOS MODOS ERA LEGAL.
DE NUESTRA PARTE, SIN CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE EL VALOR DEL PERSONAL, ENVIAR SEMEJANTE ELEMENTOS NAVALES, ANTIGUOS Y SIN POSIBILIDADES (CREIAN EN UNA SEGUNDA BATALLA DE LAS MALVINAS, A CAÑONAZO LIMPIO, COMO EN LA 1ER GM?), QUE SE ESCUCHABAN A SIMPLE OIDO FUE UN DESPROPOSITO. HUBIERA SIDO UNA HAZAÑA QUE EL BELGRANO HAYA LOGRADO ACERCARSE A ALGO PARA ATACARLO.
EN ESENCIA, UN CAPITULO MENTIROSO BIEN ESCRITO PARA JUSTIFICAR ALGO LEGAL PERO DIFICIL DE TRAGAR AUN PARA LA SOCIEDAD INGLESA. DESPUES TODO SE OLVIDA...
ON APRIL 2, 1982 Argentina invaded the Malvinas Islands. Margaret Thatcher’s Government survived this humiliation by being able to announce to Parliament the next day that a substantial task force would soon set sail with the objective of “restoring British administration”.
It was widely assumed that the main value of this force was in strengthening the country’s bargaining position in the inevitable attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the emergency.
By the end of the month that assumption no longer looked so strong. On April 29 President Reagan came out in Britain’s support. Meanwhile the British had retaken South Georgia, a dependency of the Malvinas, and the main carrier battle group was getting into position to enforce a 200-mile total exclusion zone which Britain had declared to prevent Argentina reinforcing its garrison on the Malvinas. In addition it would be looking to persuade the Argentine Navy and Air Force out to fight in the hope of causing them severe damage. This was to prepare for an eventual landing on the Malvinas.
To provoke the Argentinians into action, Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, commanding the task force in the South Atlantic, decided to give the impression that the landings had already begun. This began early on May 1 with naval bombardments and air raids against military targets. According to Woodward, the aim was to “provoke a reaction that would allow me to conduct a major attrition exercise”, and in this he was successful. Aircraft flew from Argentine bases to confront the British and they suffered significant losses when challenged by the British Sea Harriers.
UN POCO FALSO LO DEL EXITO VISTA LAS BAJAS NAVALES SUFRIDAS POR UK
The Argentine Navy also prepared to fight the Royal Navy. During the evening of May 1 Admiral Jorge Allara, on board the Argentine aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, was gearing up to mount an attack. His tracker aircraft had picked up signs of British warships 120 miles away and he was aware of the reports from the Malvinas of attempted British landings. Admiral Juan Lombardo, Commander South Atlantic, had given him new rules of engagement, allowing for attacks on the British fleet without restriction. As the carrier group moved from the north a group led by the cruiser General Belgrano would move to the south of the exclusion zone to attack any British units there using the Exocet anti-ship missiles on the destroyers accompanying the cruiser, whose own 6in guns outranged the 4.5in guns used by the British.
PENSAMIENTO ILOGICO PERO QUE JUSTIFICA LA RESPUESTA. ¿A QUÉ SE PODÍA ACERCAR EL BELGRANO SIN SER DETECTADO Y ATACADO A SU VEZ MUCHO ANTES? ¿ALGUN BUQUE AISLADO? NO CREIBLE.
The British plan was to attack the 25 de Mayo as soon as possible. The previous week the military had persuaded the War Cabinet to change the rules of engagement to allow a nuclear submarine to attack the carrier even outside the total exclusion zone, on the ground that the range of its aircraft would mean that it was a threat to British ships.
CIERTO PERO FUE UK LA QUE PUSO LA ZONA DE EXCLUSION. SI NO HUBIERA EXISTIDO CUALQUIER LUGAR HUBIERA SIDO BUENO PARA ATACAR, HASTA EN PUERTO. DE TODOS MODOS ERA UNA DECLARACION UNILATERAL SIN VALOR LEGAL NI CONTRA EL DIH.
LA CULPA FUE NUESTRA POR CREERLES.
Unfortunately for this plan, the carrier had avoided detection and was now closing in on the task force. Woodward knew this not only from intelligence on the Argentine orders to attack but also from one of his Sea Harriers that had come across the Argentine carrier group. At the same time another submarine, HMS Conqueror, had found the Belgrano group and was trailing it, but it had no permission to attack unless the group entered the exclusion zone (which intelligence had suggested it was going to do).
Woodward’s war diary noted that: “The Belgrano group is moving west [actually it was moving east], south of the Malvinas Islands shadowed by Conqueror, and may wish to effect a pincer movement from that direction.” He suspected an attack by dawn on May 2 and so decided to concentrate his forces into defensive positions. Once he had got his ships together, Woodward began to feel a bit less exposed. Yet he was frustrated by the fact that he was not able to command the submarines directly and by Conqueror’s restricted rules of engagement. At issue was not just whether he could cope with an immediate Argentine offensive but the inhibitions that would be placed on his ability to move the British campaign along over the coming days. This frustration led him to order Conqueror to attack the Belgrano. As he anticipated, because of his lack of authority over Conqueror, the order was immediately rescinded.
As he also anticipated, this episode was brought to the attention of the Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, Chief of Defence Staff, who immediately sought political agreement for a change in the rules so that British ships and submarines could attack all Argentine naval ships, submarines and auxiliaries outside the total exclusion zone. At midday on May 2, as they gathered at Chequers to consider the course of the campaign, members of the War Cabinet were asked for a quick decision. The discussion took no more than 20 minutes. William Whitelaw later recalled it as “one of the simplest decisions that I personally found myself involved in”. Particularly compelling was the question of what the politicians would say if they had refused the military request when the Belgrano could have been sunk, and the cruiser then went on to sink a British carrier with hundreds of casualties. All were asked for their views before the Prime Minister gave her own but the issue was not controversial.
In the only official report, the decision was said to reflect “the latest intelligence about the movements and intentions of the Argentine fleet, and that of the new situation created by the military events of May 1”. Although the change of rules meant that the attack could take place outside the exclusion zone, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office later noted: “Ministers had also taken into account the fact that, in the present military situation, it was unlikely that any warships would need to be engaged very far from the exclusion zone.” Soon the new rules were being transmitted to the submarines.
By this time the situation had changed. Up to the early hours of May 2, the British had interpreted Argentine intentions correctly. Allara intended to use his Skyhawks to attack the British fleet and the Belgrano was part of a pincer. At this point, however, two developments changed the Argentine plans. First the wind dropped. Launching the Skyhawks required 40 knots. The wind continued to drop and the prospect now was of further delay and the aircraft taking off with reduced fuel and weapons loaded. Nonetheless, the group continued to close on the British.
The second event was the arrival of the Sea Harrier that had spotted the carrier group (convincing Woodward of the danger he faced). Although Allara’s initial instinct was to persevere, having been told by Lombardo that he did not know the position of the British carriers, so that the “free-ranging enemy still constitutes a strong threat”, he decided that there was little point in carrying on. The forecast gave him few reasons to expect better wind conditions. The task groups were ordered “back to their former positions”.
For most of the Sunday morning Woodward had no inkling of any change in Argentine plans but by 1100 GMT (0800 local time), with the light improving, the probability of an Argentine attack was diminishing. Woodward, however, was by no means confident. Only when it became dark did he intend to move west again to attack Argentine targets on the Malvinas with naval gunfire. He knew that the Belgrano group was still being trailed by Conqueror; but not that it had reversed course two hours earlier. At 1400 GMT Conqueror reported the Belgrano’s new course to its headquarters at Northwood, but this information was not passed on to Woodward.
If it had been, Woodward’s reaction would have been the same as Northwood’s. A move in one direction could be followed by a move in the other. Concluding that an Argentine attack was not imminent was not the same as presuming that it had been postponed indefinitely. In terms of his original plan to flush out Argentine units, the best prospect he had now in terms of attrition was the Belgrano group. If it was not attacked that day then it would be returning to the fray the next time the Argentine Navy positioned itself for battle, by which time Conqueror could well have lost its contact. Woodward did not know that his wish had been granted, and approval for the new rules of engagement had already been agreed and transmitted to the submarines. He therefore again requested permission for Conqueror to attack the Belgrano.
EN ESENCIA: CAMBIOS CONTINUOS DE RUMBO DEL BELGRANO DE E A O Y VICEVERSA HACIAN IMPREDECIBLE SU ACCION FUTURA. POSIBILIDAD DE PERDERLO (HUMMM...)
RIESGO DE ATAQUE A FLOTA PRINCIPAL POR EL GRUPO "25 DE MAYO" (SUPUESTAMENTE NO HECHO POR FALTA DE VIENTOS FAVORABLES AL DESPEGUE...)
RIESGO QUE EL BELGRANO, CAMBIANDO DE RUMBO UNA VEZ MAS SE ACERQUE A ALGO Y ATAQUE CON SUS CAÑONES MUY SUPERIORES DEFENDIDO DEL PUNTO DE VISTA AEREO POR LOS SEA DART DE LA ESCOLTA...
MALENTENDIDOD, ENETENDIDOS, ORDENES Y CONTRAORDENES, PROBLEMAS EN EL MASTIL DE COMUNICACIONES, REGLAS DE ENGAGEMENT NO CLARAS, SUB FUERA DE COMANDO DEL JEFE DE FLOTA POR SER NUKE, ETC, EN EL SUB (QUE AL FINAL, POR LO QUE SEA, SI TUVO ORDENES CLARAS)
Captain Chris Wreford-Brown on Conqueror had begun May 2 expecting to
be following the Belgrano into the exclusion zone. He had been surprised by its change in course and remained uncertain as to which direction his quarry was intending to move for some time as it skirted the exclusion zone, perhaps aware of its vulnerability should it stray inside, and stayed some 18 miles to the south but still moving east. When Conqueror returned to periscope depth at 1400 GMT to receive and transmit signals, it reported on the change of direction to the west. Conqueror, however, had been suffering for some time with communication problems as a result of a damaged wireless mast (the crew had thought it might be necessary to withdraw to get the mast changed). Initially all Wreford-Brown understood was that the rules of engagement had changed: exactly how was unclear. He was aware of an order cancelling a previous order to attack (the original from Woodward — which he had not received) and that there appeared to be a new order to attack. Conqueror remained at depth until his instructions were clear. Now he was “absolutely certain”.
By the next transmission, at 1710, they were understood and this was reported back along with an intention to attack. Wreford-Brown chose the old Mk8 torpedo, in service since 1932, because as an impact weapon it had a better chance of penetrating the cruiser’s armour and anti-torpedo bilges.
SE ELIGIO EL VIEJO MK8 PUES PODIA PENETRAR LA ARMADURA....Y ERA MAS BARATO
EN OTRO BLOG DE SUBMARINISTAS SE DICE QUE LA DOCTRINA BRITANICA SON TRES TORPEDOS: PROA. MEDIO, POPA QUE ASEGURA AL MENOS DOS IMPACTOS.
At 18.57 Conqueror attacked at a range of 1,400 yards. Two hits were observed, although three explosions were heard.
DOS IMPACTOS SE OBSERVAN AUNQUE SE ESCUCHARON TRES EXPLOSIONES.
By 19.30 the initial report of the attack had been transmitted. This gave the cruiser's position, course and speed when attacked, adding “successfully attacked Belgrano. Two hits with Mark Eights. Evaded to east”. The evasion was necessary because within a few minutes they were being attacked in turn with depth charges. From 20.52 to 21.03 more depth charges were heard.
On board the Belgrano some 200 men had been killed by the initial explosion, with fire spreading because doors and hatches had been left open. Another 850 took to life rafts as the cruiser began to sink. It sent out no signal of its own asking for help. The harsh weather and heavy sea conditions battered the crippled vessel and reduced the chances for survival of the crew as they abandoned ship. It took a day before the first survivors were picked up. In all 321 men of the Belgrano lost their lives.
Militarily this had exactly the effect required: the Argentine Navy did not venture out again. Politically it caused Britain damage, for the scale of the attack appeared disproportionate and the circumstances suggested that Britain was not following its own rules.
CIERTO, Y QUÉ? DESDE CUANDO SE SIGUEN LAS REGLAS EN LAS GUERRAS...
After the war this led to claims that the attack had been ordered by the Prime Minister to make sure that there was no peace settlement. In fact the diplomatic fallout from the attack led the British to take peace initiatives much more seriously than before. The conspiracy theories were always wide of the mark. The Belgrano was sunk not because the British Government was confident in an inevitable military victory but because there was a serious risk of defeat.
VER PARA CREER. ACEPTAR ESO, MAS QUE DUDOSO, ES ACEPTAR CUALQUIER EXCUSA. DE TODOS MODOS ERA LEGAL.
DE NUESTRA PARTE, SIN CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE EL VALOR DEL PERSONAL, ENVIAR SEMEJANTE ELEMENTOS NAVALES, ANTIGUOS Y SIN POSIBILIDADES (CREIAN EN UNA SEGUNDA BATALLA DE LAS MALVINAS, A CAÑONAZO LIMPIO, COMO EN LA 1ER GM?), QUE SE ESCUCHABAN A SIMPLE OIDO FUE UN DESPROPOSITO. HUBIERA SIDO UNA HAZAÑA QUE EL BELGRANO HAYA LOGRADO ACERCARSE A ALGO PARA ATACARLO.
EN ESENCIA, UN CAPITULO MENTIROSO BIEN ESCRITO PARA JUSTIFICAR ALGO LEGAL PERO DIFICIL DE TRAGAR AUN PARA LA SOCIEDAD INGLESA. DESPUES TODO SE OLVIDA...
Podrias pasar la direccion donde se hablo del tema por favor ?
Muchas gracias. :cheers2:
Muchas gracias. :cheers2:
SI HAY REFERENCIAS
No te doy nombre porque en dos oportunidades dos adminstradores del viejo foro me CENSURARON NOMBRES Y DIRECCIONES.-
Lo mio respecto a lo privados en estos temas no va...
YA TE DIJE QUIEN ERA... a investigar... telemetristas solo tenía un PAR en el mes de ABRIL Y MAYO el BOUCHARD... y este tipo vio las estelas de los torpedos y el hundimiento. De hecho en la vieja SOLDADO DE FORTUNA le hicieron una nota en por los 80.-
A INVESTIGAR...
RESPECTO AL BELGRANO al igual que al RHAI hay HIJOS y ENTENADOS...
Saludos
NO es así... los exo debutaron en el golfo a finales de los ´70
FUENTE: ENCICLOPEDIA DE LA AVIACIÓN EDITORIAL DELTA BARCELONA con la auttorización y copyright de PRESS PILOT.-
SALUDOS:yonofui::yonofui::yonofui::yonofui::yonofui:
Cruzando datos propios con brits, decir que lo encontró en un "educated guess"
Más allá de ello, coincido 100 % con Denis, fue a buscar a los náufragos del Belgrano y lo hizo. Cientos de compatriotas le deben la vida a la tripulación del 2-P-111 y todos los demás les debemos nuestro eterno agradecimiento.
Dad,pues no se que decirle,la guerra irano-iraqui empezo en 1980,sobre los primeros exocet lanzados habla el sr,Arturo Perez Reverte(corresponsal en aquellos momentos),empezo con la llamada guerra de los petroleros,a partir del 82 cuando el tema se recrudece,por parte de aviones iraquies,yo apuesto por reverte,las enciclopedias suelen tener fallos de imprenta,pocos,pero los tienen el estimado Reverte estuvo en vivo y en directo.Ahora si usted me habla que se utilizaron antes del 80 en el golfo por otro motivo,cierro la boca.saludos.
Gente, yo hable con un tripulante del Belgrano, y ellos tres dias antes de los impactos en el belgrano, habian "detectado" al conqueror, pero cuando pidieron permiso para atacar, este no se los dieron, porque solo estaban patrullando, y hasta que no entrase en la zona argentina no podian....
El dia del disparo, lo perdieron de vista, y no lo vieron mas...
un abrazo rommel
El dia del disparo, lo perdieron de vista, y no lo vieron mas...
un abrazo rommel
Lo poco que puedo aportar para acercarnos al punto que verdaderamente el ARA Bouchard no fue víctima de ningún torpedo intencional ni casual, basta con leer el informe oficial de la Armada Argentina del hundimiento del General Belgrano acerca de la situación del Grupo de Tareas 79.3 el 2 de Mayo de 1982... en una época estaba colgado en este foro, desconozco si permanece o se perdió en el tiempo, pero en el mismo claramente decía que a pesar de la visibilidad existente (algo reducida, pero en fin no era una navegación a ciegas ni nada cercano a ello), ninguno de los buques del Grupo de Tareas navegaba en contacto visual con los demás. Está claro entonces, que, como dicen desde el HMS Conqueror, tres Mk.8 hacia el Gral Belgrano, y como dice, según dad, el telemetrista del Bouchard (los tres torpedos hacia el crucero y no hacia otro lado), resulta imposible que un torpedo se haya desviado levemente e impacte a un destructor muy alejado del objetivo final del mismo.
Saludos.
Saludos.
2-P-111
Colaborador
Hasta donde se, el dato es de señal de ESM de superficie. No se ha hablado de detección. Pero es una punta interesante para investigar. Todos los dos de Mayo la Asociación de Amigos del Belgrano realiza un acto donde suelen ir veteranos que sirvieron en el buque. Estaría bueno anotarse las preguntas y aprovechar la ocasión. El año pasado la Asociación puso a navegar en el lago del Parque centenario una réplica del buque y estuvo Bonzo presente.
mira, yo lo pregunte cuando vinieron veteranos a mi colegio hara 2 o 3 años.... y uno de ellos que no se que mierd@ era del barco que ya no recuerdo(pero era un puesto bueno) me conto que el buque lo habian detectado, y de haber recibido autorizacion, podrian haberlo hundido.... pero que nunca se autorizo atacar
POr ahí va el tema... las escaramuzas no comenzaron en 1980 entre IRAK e IRAN....
Esto es igual que el tema de MLV... todos dicen... al menos lo que NO SABES... que la guerra fue improvisada, etc. etc. etc.
Ya en los setenta los submarinos argentino iba de visita casi a diario para elegir la PLAYITA.-
Los corresponsales de guerra, como el famoso NICOLAS KASANSEW llegan tarde a la noticia, con errores, mal preparados en temas castrenses y de seguridad personal, etc. etc. etc.
NO SON LA CIA, sino fije se lo que les pasa en IRAK y cuantos "PAVOS" de la CNN muertos o heridos.-
NI mencionar la segunda guerra mundial, todos ponen de fecha 1939 POLONIA, y el resto... ESPAÑA, HUNGRIA, CHECOSLOVAQUIA, AUSTRIA, LUXEMBURGO los PRINCIPADOS...
Eso de las fechas y los hechos es tan pero tan relativo.
Le sigo señalando al excelente ENCICLOPEDIA de su país y los planos de UK de Pilot... busquela, es maravillosa.-
Saludos:yonofui:
Saludos
NO SE ALEJARON... se descontrolaron y fueron a buscar probablemente al SUB sin éxito... luego el rescate.-
Saludos
Un poco de respeto
Que yo sepa actuaron segun doctrina: busqueda y ataque del submarino para hundirlo (mas que improbable) o alejarlo.
Mala conducta hubiera sido ponerse al garete a buscar sobrevivientes en ese instante y ser los siguientes patos de la boda...con mas naufragos.
De todos modos siempre se hace asi (ver caso de la escolta del William Gustloff, navio hospital que se hundio con record mundial no sobrepasado de gente a bordo, en el Baltico en II GM)
Las paginas inglesas confirmaron ataque desde escoltas. Eran viejos, ruidosos, mal equipados y todo lo que quiera pero hicieron lo pòsible. No era su culpa el estar ahi sino de los mandos superiores.
Que yo sepa actuaron segun doctrina: busqueda y ataque del submarino para hundirlo (mas que improbable) o alejarlo.
Mala conducta hubiera sido ponerse al garete a buscar sobrevivientes en ese instante y ser los siguientes patos de la boda...con mas naufragos.
De todos modos siempre se hace asi (ver caso de la escolta del William Gustloff, navio hospital que se hundio con record mundial no sobrepasado de gente a bordo, en el Baltico en II GM)
Las paginas inglesas confirmaron ataque desde escoltas. Eran viejos, ruidosos, mal equipados y todo lo que quiera pero hicieron lo pòsible. No era su culpa el estar ahi sino de los mandos superiores.
Estimados foristas.
Existe información interesante sobre este tema descripta por foristas de Zona Militar en http://www.zona-militar.com/foros/showthread.php?t=1963&page=13
Espero que sea de utilidad.
Saludos.
Existe información interesante sobre este tema descripta por foristas de Zona Militar en http://www.zona-militar.com/foros/showthread.php?t=1963&page=13
Espero que sea de utilidad.
Saludos.
Tarkus40
Colaborador
DAD33
Ya me hiciste investigar tratando de saber que querías decir con la frase de los "hermanos y entenados"
Son conocidas las condiciones metereológicas del momento del ataque (Mal tiempo, baja visibilidad, etc.
Los telemetros del Bouchard eran, el del Radar de Control Tiro MK-25 y los de puntería de cada Torre de 5 pulgadas (tres en torres).
No hay ninguna razón operativa para que alguno de ellos estuviera apuntando al Belgrano en ese momento específico.
Supongamos que por ser cerca de las 1600 hs y en pleno cambio de guardia y en condición de "silencio radar",el oficial de Guardia de Puente o el de CIC, para registrar la formación en el libro de Navegación/Guardia pide marcación y distancia visual al Belgrano.
Recordemos que la medición de distancias en foirma visual se hace con el Micrómetro de Flouris desde el Puente y la marcación con la pínula del repetidor de girocompas, y no se utiliza el telémetro para ello.
Supongamos que por la escasa visibilidad era dificil usar el micrómetro y le piden distancia a la guardia del MK-25(telémetro más alto). Apunta al Belgrano y saca marcación y distancia. Justo en ese momento ve las estelas y luego los impactos.
Luego de eso tiene que seguir viendo la estela del tercer torpedo.pasar al Belgrano y seguir hacia ellos.
Hechos técnicos
1.- El telémetro de puntería del MK-25 al igual que los de los cañones son operados por varias personas que tienen imágen simultánea del blanco al que se le apunta, esa imagen no es exclusiva de una sola persona.
2.-El Conqueror, el Belgrano y el Bouchard estaban casi alineados en el momento de los disparos
3.-
Preguntas
1.-Si vieron las estelas los operadores del telémetro, porque no dieron la alarma al CIC para que se envíe al grupo la "Emergencia Tango"(ataque con torpedo).? De hecho la señal la envía el Bouchard luego de "sentir" en su cercanias el 3 tercer torpedo y ver que el Belgrano se frena.
2.- Siendo varias personas que ven la imágen, solo uno lo vió y se lo calló?
3.- Cómo pudo ver las estelas de los torpedos que impactaron al Belgrano si estaban practicamente alineados?
4.- vió la estela del que se venía y no avisó nada?
Conclusión
Con las condiciones metereológicas, los equipos disponibles y la situación operacional de los buques en ese momento, me parece ALTAMENTE IMPROBABLE que alguien haya visto las imágenes narradas sin dar aviso o algún tipo de acción.
Tendremos que seguir investigando para eliminar los "supongamos"
Slds
Ya me hiciste investigar tratando de saber que querías decir con la frase de los "hermanos y entenados"
Son conocidas las condiciones metereológicas del momento del ataque (Mal tiempo, baja visibilidad, etc.
Los telemetros del Bouchard eran, el del Radar de Control Tiro MK-25 y los de puntería de cada Torre de 5 pulgadas (tres en torres).
No hay ninguna razón operativa para que alguno de ellos estuviera apuntando al Belgrano en ese momento específico.
Supongamos que por ser cerca de las 1600 hs y en pleno cambio de guardia y en condición de "silencio radar",el oficial de Guardia de Puente o el de CIC, para registrar la formación en el libro de Navegación/Guardia pide marcación y distancia visual al Belgrano.
Recordemos que la medición de distancias en foirma visual se hace con el Micrómetro de Flouris desde el Puente y la marcación con la pínula del repetidor de girocompas, y no se utiliza el telémetro para ello.
Supongamos que por la escasa visibilidad era dificil usar el micrómetro y le piden distancia a la guardia del MK-25(telémetro más alto). Apunta al Belgrano y saca marcación y distancia. Justo en ese momento ve las estelas y luego los impactos.
Luego de eso tiene que seguir viendo la estela del tercer torpedo.pasar al Belgrano y seguir hacia ellos.
Hechos técnicos
1.- El telémetro de puntería del MK-25 al igual que los de los cañones son operados por varias personas que tienen imágen simultánea del blanco al que se le apunta, esa imagen no es exclusiva de una sola persona.
2.-El Conqueror, el Belgrano y el Bouchard estaban casi alineados en el momento de los disparos
3.-
Preguntas
1.-Si vieron las estelas los operadores del telémetro, porque no dieron la alarma al CIC para que se envíe al grupo la "Emergencia Tango"(ataque con torpedo).? De hecho la señal la envía el Bouchard luego de "sentir" en su cercanias el 3 tercer torpedo y ver que el Belgrano se frena.
2.- Siendo varias personas que ven la imágen, solo uno lo vió y se lo calló?
3.- Cómo pudo ver las estelas de los torpedos que impactaron al Belgrano si estaban practicamente alineados?
4.- vió la estela del que se venía y no avisó nada?
Conclusión
Con las condiciones metereológicas, los equipos disponibles y la situación operacional de los buques en ese momento, me parece ALTAMENTE IMPROBABLE que alguien haya visto las imágenes narradas sin dar aviso o algún tipo de acción.
Tendremos que seguir investigando para eliminar los "supongamos"
Slds
No intentaron buscar al Conqueror y menos tratar de hundirlo. No se enteraron de los que le pasó al CRBE hasta bastante después de que este fuera atacado.
Y cuando se enteraron, siguiendo órdenes de la superioridad, se retiraron de la zona del ataque.
No hubo ningún ataque desde los escoltas, ni con cargas ASA ni con torpedos. Y tampoco tuvieron jamás la menor idea donde estaba el Conqueror.
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